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INTRODUCTION

What is the best interpretation of contract-like behavior? The
past decade has seen a wealth of commentary and judicial dicta on
the subject of contracts. "Default"' rules have preoccupied contract scholarship. Commentators try to determine which default
rules are best under an image of contract law operating like a computer program supplying the rules for parties whose contract keyboard does not express another choice.
The analogy to computer programs and their default rules is
flawed. This deceptive analogy stems from the use of data processing programs that provide default rules whenever a program user
does not indicate otherwise. The rules of contract interpretation
apply likewise by default when parties are silent on certain matters. The rules of contract are said to fill the "gaps" in contracts.
Traditional thought holds that gaps existing in contracts should be
filled by someone other than the parties to contracts. If we revise
this traditional thinking and let contract parties speak, however,
we might find that correcting our ignorance of what parties mean
fills the gap. Under the analogy to data processing, filling contract
gaps is tantamount to creating computer programs. Computer programmers, like parties to contracts, have personalities, purposes,
and goals. Programmers and promisors manifest these qualities in
their programs and contracts. Outsiders do not catch clues to a
programmer's identity from the program alone; similarly, outsiders
such as members of the legal system cannot interpret contract language out of its context. Supposing that legal knowledge in the
form of the best legal rules produces good contract interpretation
is like supposing that the best word processing program produces
good writing. Ironically, computer programs have no gaps. Like
lawyers, programmers cannot create form programs that fit everyone well. Nor can Solomon or lawmakers create contract rules that
fit everyone.
The best contract rules can only come from the best -theory of
contract. Yet, the best theory need not provide substantive rules.
In fact, a refined will theory of contract, as suggested in this Article, requires non-substantive rules.2 Similarly, many of the gap-fill1. Default rules of contract law refer to both the law of contract which applies regardless of the intentions of the parties, immutable rules of law, and the rules of contract law
which apply unless the parties indicate otherwise, mutable rules of law. Writers usually refer
to the latter. I shall discuss both. Indeed, in my nontraditional view, immutable rules of
contract law are oxymoronic and paradoxical.
2. This Article critiques Professor Randy Barnett's consent theory of contract. See
Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 321 (1986) [hereinaf-
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ers of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) take a non-substantive form, as does much of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Will theory derives its force from leaving the substantive agreement of the parties to the parties.
No singular substantive interpretation of people and their institutions exist. There are too many personalities, too many histories, and too many aspirations. People make contracts and so the
same is true for any suggested right or best interpretation of contracts or contract-like behavior. People are worthy of too much respect for contract law to ask them to wear any convenient, off-therack interpretive or default rule. The interpretation of contracts
must rest on the primacy of the consent of the parties-their wills.
But it has been said that where the parties have not spoken,
where their agreement has left gaps, the emphasis on consent is
misplaced.' Thus, default rules serve the wills of contract parties
as well as any other, for a court has to decide a case of missing
wills. This analysis errs grievously because it means that in cases of
unclear or ambiguous expressions, the law might take any interpretation at all. Indeed, all expressions pose the problem of interpretation. It is hornbook law, however, that we search for the meanings of contract terms in the customs and practices of the parties
ter Barnett, Consent). Barnett recently continued his elaboration of a liberal theory of justice as applied to contracts. See Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Sound of Silence].
Barnett takes what he calls the emerging heuristic of contract law discussion, default rules,
and attempts to show how our existing model of consent is too narrow. In particular, the
gap-filler rules of Article 2 of the U.C.C., as default rules, are not necessarily imposed by the
force of law, as generally supposed, but are actually consented to by parties to contracts
under certain circumstances. Part III.A. of this Article sets forth Barnett's consent theory;
part V.A.-B. sets forth Barnett's thinking on default rules.
Barnett's theory exemplifies what is right and what is wrong with modern contract law
and theory. He adopts an interpretive formalism that forgets what contract is
about-honoring party intentions. Many of the recent formalistic writings on default rules
have drawn upon the work of Lon Fuller, and especially his great article, Considerationand
Form. See, Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). Fuller
appreciated the value and limits to formalism. That he offered an explanation, an analysis
of the several functions of the law of consideration, including formal functions, shows only
that formalism can serve some functions. Adopting formalism in any particular legal matter,
however, requires more than a bow to the occasional usefulness of formalism. All schools of
contract thought have repudiated the traditional doctrine of consideration.
3. E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation,89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991). But conduct other than words may express
assent even under the traditional view. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1979).
Even in objective theory, then, to say that parties left a gap in their agreement, requires a
review of not only their agreement but also their conduct. Until one conducts an extensive
investigation, one cannot say the contract is incomplete or has a gap. The alternative is to
ignore or deny what Barnett calls the "Sound of Silence," which includes the tacit assumptions or understandings that contracts might be shown to share.
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or the groups to which they belong. Why should we conduct this
factual investigation only when express terms are at issue? 4 Are
parties who are silent on a given matter undeserving of the same
respect? One might also believe that because most people prefer
efficiency, efficient default rules should be adopted. If this is true,
the efficiency theorist need not limit rule-making to instances of
party silence. Since words do not define themselves, the efficiency
theorist ought to construe even express contract terms under this
norm.5 Interpretation does not begin after the contract's last page.
Moreover, the only way to minimize the political dilemma of
siding with one or another theory of contractual interpretation, be
it for example, efficiency or fairness, is to maximize party autonomy by refraining from sanctioning any of the respectable views on
the best interpretation of contract. Maximizing party autonomy
also coincides with the fundamental notion of contract, party-centrism and not legal control. This is not a mere coincidence.
We need to rethink whether the traditional view that contract
4. Charny, supra note 3, at 1825-30. "What about cases in which the parties' intentions, as gleaned from the language of the contract or perhaps even from testimony, are at
variance with the court's notion of what would be the efficient term to interpolate into the
contract? If the law is to take its cues from economics, should efficiency or intentions govern? Oddly, the latter." RICHARD A. POSNEa, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (4th ed. 1992).
5. The problem with an economic interpretation of behavior is no different in principle than any singular interpretive canon. Unless the parties fit the descriptive premises of
an interpretation, the interpretation cannot be correct. Choosing to adopt any particular
interpretive canon requires knowledge that these premises are either true or should be true.
The latter normative judgment must then be defended as better than others apart from the
descriptive premises unless they are true. See, e.g., Coleman et al., infra note 13. Even if it
is true that contract is wealth-maximizing behavior, the *descriptive premises of the economic account presume wealth-maximization arises from the choice of the parties. But, if
that is true, then it is also wealth-maximizing to choose to forsake a contract already made.
A normative theory must account for individual freedom of choice only at the inception of a
contract but not later on when a dispute occurs, lest economics portray parties as rational at
the time of contract formation but irrational at the time of breach. Nevertheless, an economic interpretation of the behavior of particular parties may offer the best account of what
those parties intended on matters which turn out to be important to resolve. But no interpretive theory needs to be legislated so that all parties are bound to one interpretation.
Nor is an economic interpretation alone in this; an altruistic or a cooperative descriptive premise cannot explain why one choice an altruistic or a cooperative party makes at
formation of a contract should receive legal protection, but later choices, such as breach,
should not.
Finally, it would still be foolish to suppose that no parties to contract fit a model of
efficiency, altruism, or cooperation. Instead of choosing any one of these, or other paradigms
of intention, contract law should leave all paradigms that are credible available for any particular contract dispute. That this open-ended methodology leaves courts or juries with discretion also means that it empowers parties to contracts. Thus, all theorizing offering a new
interpretation of contract behavior is welcome under will theory so long as a substantive
interpretive theory does not claim to be the right objective theory. Will theory is right
merely because will theory makes no substantive interpretive claim.
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law needs default rules is plausible. Professor Randy Barnett's
traditional consent theory rests on an efficient markets theory. I
contend that no particular idea of contract emerges from this market-pricing theory. Moreover, Barnett's claim for an important informative role for consent in the calculus of default contractual
rules is weak because his theory leaves the case for any contractual
rules, and perhaps contract, in doubt. This may require a reconceptualization of standard contract discourse, such as gaps in contracts. This Article argues that will theory represents a useful
reconceptualization of contracts discourse because will theory leads
one away from the false choice of fraudulent or hypothetical legal
rules. Will theory conforms contract to the liberal ideal of party
autonomy. A will theory of contract lacks a set of substantive default rules, and contract law itself may need no substantive rules at
all. A default mechanism need not have rule-like, result-oriented
characteristics. Default mechanisms might well be a set of procedures and factors, or as I prefer, an autonomy guidebook."
This Article uses Professor Randy Barnett's consent theory as
a figure for the traditional view of contract law. Part II of this Article contrasts basic premises underlying traditional contracts theory and will theory. Part III sets forth Barnett's consent theory
and suggests that the related problems of ignorance and substantive contract law jeopardize any meaningful moral basis of contract
in autonomy.7 Part IV criticizes consent theory for its failure to
take seriously the correspondence between actual and manifested
assent. Part V examines and criticizes Barnett's recent claims that
consent theory helps identify appropriate default rules of contract.
Part V.C. suggests that the model for gap-filling default rules, the
U.C.C., provides instead a paradigm for will theory, nonsubstantive
guidelines for fact-sensitive adjudication of contract disputes. Part
VI calls for even more nonsubstantive contract rules than the
many nonsubstantive rules that already fill contracts cases, texts,
and codes.

6. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).

7. A future article continues the critique and begins a positive exposition of will theory. It compares the objective theory of contracts to will theory and shows how practically
relevant philosophical difficulties may be managed by will theory and not objective theory in
three philosophically and doctrinally troubled areas: gift promises, social promises, and duress. What will theory does in these areas it can do throughout contract law. Yet, in this
Article I do not carry out the implications of will theory through all of contract law.
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CONTRASTING THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF CONSENT AND

WILL THEORIES

Theories of contract law may draw on several meanings of assent to a contract. Assent may range from the actual understandings of the contract parties to the sometimes fictitious licensing of
courts to fill gaps in agreements. Default rules of contract law fit
the latter idea of assent premised in objective theory, such as Barnett's consent theory. Evidence of the parties' understandings fit
the former idea of assent premised in will theory.
A.

Several Meanings of Assent

Contract uses several ideas of assent. Sometimes assent in contract law means actual, subjective assent.8 At other times, perhaps
more often, assent means giving the appearance of having actually
assented, or objective consent.' Finally, assent sometimes refers to
8. This, of course, was the nineteenth century will theory of assent that included the
metaphor of the "meeting of the minds." Although easy to caricature (e.g., Steven J. Burton,
The Case of the Homunculean Explorers, 1988 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 299), the received wisdom
of a movement from will to objective theory in the twentieth century has not been doctrinally complete nor without philosophical headaches. The individualist ethic of will theory
has not seemed compatible with either the objective theory of contract assent or the rise

elsewhere in modern law of a communitarian ethic. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980). What is subjective, actual assent is not mysterious: it
ascribes intent to parties who act in certain socially conceived ways. As with other concepts
such as "electrons" or "university," subjective or actual assent may be ridiculed simply by

asking to see an example. See generally GILBERT

RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND

(1949). For a

comparable caricature of orthodoxy's objective test of assent, see infra note 9.
9. The conventional belief holds that because we lack direct evidence of subjective
assent, we should use an objective test that locates indirect evidence of intent. Thus, when
Able says yes to Baker's offer, we interpret Able's objective assent as present when Able
gives a common indication of that assent, by her saying yes, for example. But this objective
test of Able's assent depends on something different: that Baker believed Able agreed. Suppose we point out a hard lesson of experience to Baker, that in fact Able's saying yes does
not preclude the possibility that Able might have her mental fingers crossed, and so she
does not mean what she appears to mean.
Baker should not deny this is always possible. But Baker will tell us that he would not*
be making a deal with Able if he thought there were any real possibility that was the case.
Baker would tell us that is not the case because he has direct evidence: Abel said yes. Baker
trusts that when Able says yes, she means it. They share a social convention when they
might have had, instead, a code. Baker might further inform us that if Able were to break
the deal, Baker would have no problem showing that anyone who knew Baker would know
that Abel meant yes when she said yes.
An objective test of indirect evidence of assent would also require that we rearrange
how we talk generally. Thus, to communicate how I conclude that Able only gave indirect
evidence of assent, I shall prefatorily have to say this is indirect evidence of my conclusion
because there is no way of your getting into my mind to see for yourself. Thus, bear in mind
that my tongue has lately been on a frolic of its own and may only tomorrow return to
corresponding with my true thoughts.
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a legal conclusion under contract law lacking any pretense of resting on either party's actual intention, as where contract parties are
said to have assented or consented to default rules of contract law
unless they provide otherwise. 10 In this last meaning of assent
neither subjective nor objective assent is typically present; assent
is merely an assumption of risk or a license for the rules of contract law.
Three bases of contract mirror the differences between agreement, consent, and risk-assumption. First, will theory holds that
people bind themselves to contracts by actually agreeing or promising. Contrary to this assumption theorists and jurists have denied
that promisors are liable for what they actually intended. Second,
an objective theory of promissory liability holds that people are
liable for what they have said and not what they meant." Third,
the rise of the premise of validity for indefinite agreements in the
past fifty years has led to a third form of promissory liability under
which parties are said to have impliedly agreed to the terms a
These unremarkable points in no way suggest that Baker should trust everyone but
point out-that if contract parties were to obsess, as lawyers are wont, about dishonesty from
even those with whom they share a basis of trust, there would not be contracts for lawyers
to worry. Because nearly everyone means yes when they say yes, we share a convention
which entitles us to call that direct evidence. Will theory does not require the objective
theory's superfluous preface. Compare "assent is not a mere appearance .... [t]here must
be conduct and a conscious will to engage in that conduct," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1979), with, "a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not

impair the obligation he purports to undertake." Id. § 17 cmt. c. But even if Able does not
purport to undertake any obligation, and so her "conscious will" is lacking, the objective
theory may bind Able to a contract obligation because a reasonable person could believe
Able's "mere appearance" manifested assent. Objectivists might explain that where Able
ostensibly appeared to assent, she did assent. That is a deep contradiction. For, we may not
need to rely on mere appearances; we rely on mere appearances under the objective theory
because we do not know what Able intended. Nevertheless, Baker must actually believe that
Able's appearance of assent meant that Able did assent. Otherwise, protecting Baker from
Able's appearance of assent serves no party interest other than Baker's advantage-taking. If
Baker thus needs to show his genuine subjective appreciation of Able's behavior, the objective theory rests upon what it meant to deny subjective intention. Just why Baker's subjective intention should trump Able's in this way requires explanation. This and other mysteries of the objective theory are examined in a future article.

10. For example, under the U.C.C. the conventional account holds that by consenting
to a goods contract lacking agreement as to price but nevertheless intending to contract,
parties are obligated to a court's setting a reasonable price. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1990). In this
view the parties did not actually agree to the court's setting the price, but they assumed the
risk of that eventuality when they failed to reach agreement. Will theory offers a better
account: Consult the parties' past behavior for what these or parties like these meant the
price term to be. If you want to say such standards are only indirect evidence of what the

parties meant, see U.C.C. sections 1-205 and 2-208.
11.

E.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
JR., THE COMMON LAw 302-03, 307
(1881); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.

1911) (Learned Hand, J.); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
417, 419 (1899).
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court constructs to complete the indefinite agreement.
The several ideas of assent represent different theories of contract obligation. A will theory of contract appreciates the special
self-imposed nature of contract obligation and uses evidence of actual party intentions to derive obligation." The appearances principle of the succeeding, and perhaps yet ascendant, objective theory of assent, triumphed because it could resolve hard cases in
which the parties' subjective understandings differed. Further, using the seeming scientism of the objective test of consent even in
easy cases removed the metaphysics of the storied "meeting of the
minds."
B.

Contracts and Gaps: The Need for Default Rules

The question of indefiniteness in agreements or gaps in contracts has received much attention in recent years. 13 Contract
scholarship has aimed at reconstructing how gaps in contracts
should be filled."' Thus, the issue has been framed: "What are the
best default rules of contract law?" Yet, contract default rules are
justifiable only by the third and weakest form of assent: risk
assumption. 15
Why contract law should choose any particular default rules
remains largely unexplained. Perhaps an indirect empiricism supports an efficiency thesis. An efficiency theorist might argue that
since contract law has traditionally tried to give parties what they
12. See

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE chs. 1 & 2 (1981).
13. E.g., id. ch. 5; Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87 (1989); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Rules in
Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 639 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Mitigation Principle: Toward A General Theory of Contractual Obligation,69 VA. L.
REV. 967 (1983); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,67
VA.

L.

REV.

1089 (1981).

14.

Perhaps this has occurred in reaction to the vision of contract as dead, a denial of
the death of contract (see GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)): That contract
should not be dead. "[T]he 'resurrection of contract' is a recognition of contract law's proper
function as a transfer mechanism that is conceptually dependent on more fundamental notions of individual entitlements." Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 321 (emphasis added).
For the most part (Fried here is the lonely exception, see supra note 12), the renewed interest is in contract qua contract, as opposed to the 1970s banners of contract qua tort or
contract as relationalism. See Gilmore, supra; IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). This stems from writers interested in law
and economics. See generally, Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Resurrection of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 184 (1982) (Book Review).
15. See, e.g., Coleman et al., supra note 13, at 641-49; supra part II.A.
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intended in their contract, giving parties efficient gap-fillers will
most likely produce the agreements parties would have made had
they expressly agreed about the undetermined1 6 events. Thus, parties to contracts would choose in advance the most efficient term
that entitles the law to presume the parties consciously chose the
term. Therefore, parties pre-consent to efficient gap-fillers. Yet, a
leading contract theorist, Professor Randy Barnett, has disclaimed
a general normative force of economic theory as a basis for contract law. Barnett has said that because efficiency theory presupposes some agreements are enforceable, efficiency theory cannot
distinguish the unenforceable from the enforceable. 17 Yet Barnett's
thesis that consent supports certain default rule choices would
seem to require some theory about party behavior. Even if efficiency could not explain why some agreements are enforceable and
others are not, efficiency could perhaps inform some default
rules." Thus, if consent theory alone does not lead to particular
16. "Undetermined," under the traditional view, means that the express terms, including those fairly implied-in-fact, do not provide a basis for resolving a contractual dispute. At
this point, interpretation is then thought to end and construction of the parties' intent to
begin. For there really are gaps in contracts. This is similar, if not identical, to the traditional belief that law has gaps. Ronald Dworkin has steadily and convincingly maintained
that this view confounds judges and legal philosophers. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1967); Ronald M. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1057 (1975); RONALD M. DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 1 (1986). Will theory acknowl-

edges that interpretation neither begins nor ends but pervades communicative activity.
17. Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 278-79.
18. One major problem provoked by the new analyses of contract default rules is the
meaning of efficiency and its relation to autonomy. For example, Ayres and Gertner claim
that default rules in the form of "penalty rules" will produce efficiency which therefore
should guide the selection of default rules. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 92. Barnett
uses their idea of penalty defaults for rationally informed parties. Barnett is at the same
time committed to at least the objective test of consent and has recently highlighted the
need for default contract rules to come as close as possible to the real intentions of the
parties when the parties are not rationally informed. Yet, Barnett chooses penalty default
rules despite his commitment to consent to provoke contracting parties, who should know
the rules of the legal system, to express their actual intentions in the contract and avoid the
penalty rule. In so doing Barnett, like Ayres and Gertner (and others), refers to such selfexpressions as efficient. Given Barnett's foundational philosophy, it would appear that he,
and perhaps others, include in the term efficient, or mean instead, autonomous. For to
choose for oneself is to act autonomously. Under Barnett's theory society wants people to
choose for themselves because individuals and associations have greater knowledge than the
state. Thus, autonomy and efficiency are for this purpose quite similar. On Barnett's theory,
however, autonomy seems to be the philosophical surrogate for a detailed scientific notion of
efficiency. Most "off-the-rack" default rule theorists seem to proceed the other way: some
sort of economics is the surrogate for the parties' autonomy, what they would have agreed to
if. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 13, at 262 n.4.
Indeed, the introduction of the metaphor of efficiency should lead both ethical autonomists and economic autonomists on the same paths in contract law. By commitment to
party control of contracts, each school should find its way to the same general conclusions
that: (1) that contracts should strive to match legal ideas to party intentions, and (2) that
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contract law rules, efficiency theory might. 19
Nevertheless, this last suggestion presupposes that consent
theory and efficiency theory are discrete. Barnett's consent theory,
however, rests on a market-pricing theory that he believes overcomes several problems of social organization.2 0 A market-pricing
theory would seem, however, to support a will theory of contract as
well as Barnett's objective consent theory. Moreover, Barnett's
claim for an important informative role for consent in the calculus
of default contractual rules is weak because his theory leaves the
case for any contractual default rules, and perhaps contract, in
doubt. While this Article questions Barnett's liberal theory of contract and consent on several major matters, it uses Barnett as a
figure for the traditional view of contract law. The traditional view
of contracts rests on notions like Barnett's.2 1
Barnett takes contract law to serve a property transfer system
resting on liberal principles of voluntary resource allocation. First,
the liberal principles from which Barnett reasons can secure the
blessings they promise without a law of contracts of any particular
distributive or consequentialist ideas cannot do so.
Despite this common ground the ethicists find the economists quite troubling. Here the
difference is one of basic philosophy: the ethicist looks at human history and finds remarkable complexity in human behavior. The economist looks at human history as a challenge to
know the science of social organization. As to that, the economist almost has to be optimistic and the autonomist, skeptical. Thus, each time central planning, which must not be distinguished from the legal system, claims to know who knows what, autonomists of every
stripe need to worry.
19. See Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 281-82.
20. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 844-48.
21. This Article does not critically address much of market libertarian theory, except
the claim that a market economy "explains or justifies" contract doctrine including default
rules better than writers such as Fried, supra note 12. To find in the economic markets a
justification of contract law does not commend the nature of any particular contract law or
system of property entitlements or rights. Barnett sees contract as part of a larger legal
system responding to the needs or aims of a property transfer system. It may be true that
market needs or aims narrow the choice of nonconsensual concepts in transfer law. For example, a negotiable instruments transfer law may suggest concepts like holder in due course.
Another transfer system might be more fully consensual.
The conflicting claims to property by the true owner and the bona fide purchaser produce the same problems in property law as do the claims of parties to misunderstandings in
contract law. By viewing contract as part of a larger property law, one may conclude that
the needs or aims of transfer/property suggest the latter's nonconsensual response in contract law. Put another way, if people may be held to property transfers to which they did
not actually assent, it follows they should be held to promises they did not actually intend
to make. But even if this is true about property, more than symmetry should support the
same for contract lest one substitute a minor transfer function of contract for the central
function of contract. This is the premise that drives Barnett's contract theory of consent:
contract as transfer. Barnett needs to explain, however, why we should prefer that paradigm
to others, especially in these times when we have seen the claim for normative primacy for
allocative efficiency so widely rejected.
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form. These principles concern freedom to hold and transfer property that in turn presumes a fundamental consensualism that some
of our ideas of assent betray, such as the objective theory and the
assumption of risk theory. But contract as we know it is in no way
necessarily nested in these principles. In fact the tendency toward
legalistic consent ideas threatens the consensual transfer system as
well as the true basis of contract in autonomy. Contract rests on
autonomy and actual assent as the moral basis of contract.
Second, even if a law of contract may be desirable as a part of
a more effective transfer system, and even if consent is important
to the latter, it does not follow that what may be an appropriate
notion of consent within a transfer system is a valid notion of consent for contract.2 2 But assuming what the law takes as consent for
contract should be symmetrical with a legal system's concept of
consent in transfer law, what transfer law should say about consent
needs to be normatively defended. Thus, if people like Barnett
think contractual consent is logically determined by property or
transfer law, they must normatively explain the latter. Barnett
dresses up the old chestnut about clear boundaries and the like,
but that is unconvincing because neither the reliance of the true
owner of property nor the reliance of the bona fide purchaser has
an abstractly higher claim. For that reason, neither wins every conflict within the doctrine; courts struggle through litigation; and the
wise take precautions such as obtaining title insurance.
Third, if autonomy is the ground for enforcing promises, as
liberal principles suppose, the idea of autonomy limits the notion
of consent in contract: the intent to contract becomes dominant
and not the seeming vestige of an old and disreputable will theory.
Whether or not one accepts the function of contract as a voluntary
resource allocation system, understanding contract as voluntary
behavior under liberal principles promotes the actual intentions of
the parties and not the use of the most rational hypothetical
intentions.
Courts have used the hypothetical bargain technique to re22. I make no argument against a law of contract per se nor, in the strongest sense,
any particular version.. My argument is with any version. See supra text accompanying
notes 2-3. Rather, I want to show that the traditional views, such as Barnett's, lack a moral
foundation in autonomy by adopting particular substantive contract rules. Barnett would
cure the moral infirmity some of the time by claiming that only "conventionalist" default
rules may be justified in contract law. Some of the time does not suffice. Furthermore, in
advocating a conventionalist rule solution, Barnett perpetuates the notion of gaps that muddles the problem of interpretation; by adopting the objective test of intention, he perpetuates a transfer-preoccupied dichotomy between legal and actual intent. We would do better
by removing the cracked lens of the objective theory of assent and interpretation. Will theory transforms legal questions into largely factual issues.
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solve so-called gaps in agreements."3 Given an indefinite agreement, modern courts try to figure out what the parties would have
done had they thought about the event that occurred to which
Othe expressed agreement of the parties was silent. This technique
is a part of the American interpretive process that transcends contract law and may be seen in constitutional, statutory, and other
documentary interpretation.2 4 Nor is the hypothetical bargain form
of expression 'limited to contractual or documentary matters:
Thomas Jackson has set forth a theory of bankruptcy in such
terms. 5 But asking what hypothetical bargaining parties would
have done is merely a stylistic introduction to a theory of interpretation and alone does not state such a theory. 6 What particulars
one should attribute to the parties to a hypothetical bargain is a
normative choice that needs justification. For contract, where parties are real not imaginary, that choice should be autonomy.
For contract, Barnett has suggested that some contract default
rules should be "conventionalist . . .based on the commonsense
expectations of most persons. '27 Barnett claims that such conventionalist default rules follow from his consent theory. But Barnett
also finds favor in penalty default rules of contract law for parties
who may be expected to know the rules. Yet Barnett's consent theory does not make a plausible case for any conventional institution
23. See Charny, supra note 3, at 1816. Charny and others have taken the position that
the analysis of contract expectations through a hypothetical bargain technique resolves
nothing until one decides, for example, what level of idealization or generalization one
should use in the analysis. From that Charney appears to conclude, with others, that when
parties are silent, contract law may choose any idealization or generalization. But that depends on a strong justification for the conclusion that the parties really were silent-that
gaps really exist. Compare negligence: What idealization or generalization of the reasonable,
prudent person, does negligence choose? We do not often specify this in advance because
the issue of fault would require a different moral basis if we did. Notice, however, that strict
products liability imposes from above a legal standard based on some putative and. controversial capacity of central planning to know what a proper allocation of responsibility is. It
is no accident that similar theorizing supports strict liability in tort and default rules of
substance in contract. What is strange is a common source in economic libertarianism.
24. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992).
25. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). For a
critique see David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987)
(Book Review).
26. See Charny, supra note 3, at 1816 ("Yet fundamental issues of method and justification remain unresolved [by the hypothetical bargaining technique].").
27. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 886. Certainly, Barnett limits default
rules only in cases of rationally ignorant parties and finds the choice of default rule immaterial to rationally informed parties. The key idea there is that only some parties do take the
risk of an unexpected default rule-those rationally informed parties who by definition have
or should have the knowledge of an unconventional rule. These ideas are critiqued infra
part V.B.
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of contract.28 Charles Fried has taken another course in his will
theory of contract, and Fried has opined that "[t]he gaps cannot
be filled, the adjustments cannot be governed, by the promise principle." 2 9 Fried's solution is "residual general principles of law." 30
To ask how contract law might choose default rules implies
that contract should provide rules for parties who have not expressed themselves. Because recent default theorizing has presumed that default rules are justifiably imposed on parties, the
case for imposing efficient or any default rules on parties has not
been made. 1 If it were true in a given case that the parties would
have preferred invalidation of the contract in the event that occurred, as of the time the contract was formed, adopting this or
that rule would subordinate party autonomy. Were it true that the
contract-making conventions and the legal rules of contract-making converged and also that both practices enjoyed high esteem,
then it would be foolish to question the notion of contract, the desirability of a set of default rules or any particular default rules.
Indeed, were there congruence between actual conventions of contract-making and legal rules, an objective imputation of party assent would never be necessary, for will theory would fully explain
the congruence. Instead, the persistence of objective theories of assent shows wide disagreement about the legitimacy of contract, as
for example, the legal effect of signing what many conceive as
pieces of paper not contracts with a capital C, and the duty to
read."
28.

See infra parts III-IV.
FRIED, supra note 12, at 69.
30. Id.
31. The problem of assent in contract law is largely overlooked. Writers recognize a
need to justify the obligation of a default rule but seem to ignore that this applies as well to
expressed contract terms which a party did not appreciate. Barnett recognizes this central
issue, but his commitment to traditional views (such as gaps and objective tests) precludes
his suggesting more than the band-aids of additional formalities or penalty rules to solve the
problem. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 888-90; infra note 158. Using
actual assent to justify default rules may be difficult, but the greater problem is justification
of most of what lies in writings the law calls contracts by assent under any theory other
than will theory.
32. The duty to read what is in a document one signs has been arguably transformed
into a duty to be bound only to what one should reasonably notice, legal rules of conspicuousness (e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990)), or reasonably expect. Id. § 2-302. Indeed, this
transformation mirrors Barnett's distinction between the kind of default rules one may impose on rationally knowledgeable contract parties and rationally ignorant parties. The latter
are not culpably ignorant of default rules they would not expect. The same seems to be true
of small type in contract forms and terms too onerous to be expected. Barnett, Sound of
Silence, supra note 2, at 890 n.183.
The transformation seems to have been understood as the invasion of distributive or
fairness of the bargain ideas into contract. But Karl Llewellyn said this about unconsciona-

29.
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A consensualist premise of contract can, however, use contract
rhetoric to develop any sort of scheme of contractual default rules.
Parties who did not plausibly agree to something may be said to
consent thereto. Parties for whom one cannot plausibly make a
case for consent may be said to have run the risk of assuming the
liability of a default rule. In this way the door opens for non-autonomous default rules, such as penalty default rules that are not
intended by any party. Consent as autonomy suggests that default
rules be left to the parties. Non-substantive default rules are required so long as social conventions remain controversial, as they
shall in a pluralistic society.
C.

Hypothetical Bargains: Assent as Licensing

Contract law has traditionally conducted the elaboration of
agreements under the idea of hypothetical analysis of what the
parties might have done about the missing or difficult contract
term. At one time the doctrine of indefiniteness constrained hypothetical contract elaboration. Indefiniteness fell to a presumption
of validity. The presumption of validity takes the agreement behavior of the parties as a license to elaborate as fully as necessary
the missing terms of the agreement. An agreement with missing
terms is perceived the way one would view a person in an oarless
rowboat. Because one expects that what that person wants is oars,
one also expects that the parties have licensed courts to supply the
33
missing oars to the agreement.
ble contract terms: "What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more
is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the
dickered terms." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960). Cf. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).

An immutable duty to read contracts one signs would contradict Llewellyn's statement
of unconscionability as lack of assent. An objective test of intention creates the controversial
choice between the views that one should read what she signs and one is not bound to
unconscionable terms or contracts. Will theory chooses neither but would ask for evidence
in contested cases on the allegations of each party that the party's expectation better corresponded to the parties' conduct. The U.C.C. supports will theory in this matter by requiring
a factual hearing on claims of unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1990). See also infra part V.C.
33. David Charny's discussion recalls Cardozo's typically arresting metaphor of an instrument, "instinct with an obligation" in the casebook favorite, Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). Charny, supra note 3, at 1825. The metaphor no doubt
cheers those who have faith in the law's systematic exposition of those agreements that
deserve enforcement. Still, I believe that great jurist ought to have had evidence of the
context and purpose, the trade background and the parties' basic assumptions, and the extent of Wood's reliance before he uttered the question-begging metaphor-for none of that
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The licensing to which modern law has moved in the field of
incomplete contracts reflects also a popular form of statutory interpretation under which courts understand their function in interpreting legislation as supplying missing or explicating difficult
terms. Like promisors, legislators are said to consent to, in the
sense of licensing, judicial interpretation of their intentions. This
interpretive methodology has become so familiar and dogmatic
that one must sometimes struggle to recognize any difference between exegetic conclusions and factually accurate statements. That
one or the other exegesis was the intent of a promisor or a legislature portrays a legal conclusion as a finding of fact. To say that a
promisor licensed the court to impose an obligation is neither to
say that a promisor in fact made such a promise, nor that the
promisor agreed. Rather, the license acted as an assumption of
risk.
Unlike judicial licensing in the matter of statutes or constitutions that may be constitutionally (inter-institutionally) compelled,
judicial licensing in the matter of contracts may be defended only
on the premise of parties' intent. Unless the parties mutually preferred that a court resolve their dispute over missing or unclear
terms, courts might leave such parties as they were through modest restitutionary principles. Asking what such parties would have
preferred had they known of the problem in advance seeks a true
or perfect theory of justice. Such a theory of justice would explain
what particular parties would want by explaining everything. Everyone would assent to such a theory. We can explain why we lack
such a theory of justice by observing that people hold different
ideas about justice. That is what libertarianism means.
III.

BARNETT'S TRADITIONAL VIEW OF CONSENT IN CONTRACT LAW

A will theory of contract focuses on the parties' actual assent.
Parties bind themselves to contractual obligation because they actually assent to promises or agreements. The liberty principle entitles parties to bind themselves to contracts. Parties do not incur
contractual liability because they merely manifest assent without
intending to assent. The justification of contractual liability is the
actual assent of the parties. Binding parties to contracts or rules of
law that neither their express agreement, their past practices, nor
their legitimate expectations support, creates justifications from
came before Cardozo's court. The case arose on the pleadings and Cardozo reasoned only
from the document the parties executed. The only issue was whether the motion by defendant for judgment on the pleadings had been properly denied by the trial court. Wood, 118
N.E. at 118. Perhaps that is all Cardozo said. See also POSNER, supra note 4, at 92.
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outside the parties' assent. These justifications may have sufficient
force to prevail. Yet, non-party justifications cannot draw on the
principle of liberty to tip the scales in a particular contract dispute
if the parties' exercise of their liberty to contract never adopted
such a justification. The common justification for filling contractual gaps has exploited the liberty principle by justifying legal
rules as those of which the parties assumed the risk or licensed the
court by making such a contract.
A.

Barnett's Consent Theory

Whether one heeds the rhetoric and dogma of contract doctrine or the elaborate principles set forth by Barnett's consent theory, one would likely want to tie contract default rules to the intentions of parties to contract disputes. Where actual intentions
are difficult to discern, one would want to turn to some second-best
theory, such as the test of objective intention or consent, as I have
suggested above. Finally, along with modern commentary, one
would be accustomed to adopt assumption of risk notions of intent
or consent to justify default- rules as to which neither subjective
nor objective manifestations of intent seem to be available.
Barnett's consent theory follows three philosophical principles
that state a liberal theory of justice. To say that these principles
are familiar would understate the clarity and originality of his
presentation. First, contract or private ordering of resources is better than centralized ordering because of the problem of personal or
local knowledge held by individuals and associations and beyond
the reach of central planners.3 4 Second, a consent theory is required to implement the knowledge goal, and yet remains independent of the knowledge problem because of the problems of interest
and partiality. 5 Third, communicating knowledge of justice is necessary so that the actions required by justice may be accessible to
all. 6 This third principle implements the first principle by establishing a legal regime in which an objective theory of assent will
emerge. "Only a general reliance on objectively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a decentralized system of rights to perform
its allotted boundary-defining function ....
Within contract law,
[the objective approach] provides a way of handling the secondorder problem of knowledge," which is to communicate the requirements of justice. 7 This consent theory derives from the polit34.
35.
36.
37.

Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 837.
Id. at 849-55.
Id. at 855-59.
Id. at 857-58.
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ical-economy theory symbolized by Friedrich Hayek.5 5 In that orbit
freedom of the individual is dominant and is consistent with a
market-centered economic order or market-efficiency. Individual
economic choice subordinates communitarian choice.39
Individuals make their economic choices through contract law
that is part of a wider system of property entitlements. Default
rules, continues Barnett, are consented to by parties who "mani38. Id. at 835 nn.44-45.
39. On the issue of the proper norm by which to choose default rules for contract gap
cases, this political philosophy could as well adopt efficiency as nullification of the contract.
That is, one may believe that Hayek-inspired individualism would bar the state from coercing a fictitious contract term on a party. Charles Fried, the leading autonomy or will theorist, stated that "[tihe further courts are from the boundary between interpretation and
interpolation, the further they are from the moral basis of the promise principle and the
more palpably are they imposing an agreement." FRIED, supra note 12, at 61. Although the
expressed rationale was perhaps different, classical contract took that view and invalidated
many agreements for indefiniteness. Early applause for the U.C.C.'s conquest of indefiniteness and the common law reluctance (and frequent refusal) to make contracts for the parties, now seems strained: "The Uniform Commercial Code has made a valiant attempt to
correct the shortcomings of the common law and to bring contract law into line with the
expectations of businessmen and to honor their belief that a deal is on." FRIEDRICH KESSLER
& GRANT GILMoRE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 173 (2d ed. 1970). How do they (or
we) know when a deal by others is on? See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204, -207 (1990). The third
edition of the cited casebook deletes the "valiant attempt to correct the common law" and
adds: "To remedy the situation once and for all." FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 260 (3d ed. 1986). Section 2-207 quickly became controversial because
of the problematical substantive conclusion section 2-207(1) imposed. Under the first rule of
section 2-207(1), a party may assent to a proposed contract even though she includes in her
response additional or different material terms. So long as a response to an offer is "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation," assent is present.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990). Yet, as the law had been for many years before the Code, her inclusion of additional or different material terms may signal her intention merely to make a
counter-offer. Nevertheless, the Code makes the substantive interpretive choice for the offeree rather than leave the issue to one of (interpretive) fact.
It may be true that this presumption of assent rule has become trivial as parties may,
and probably do generally, include "conditional acceptance" language in their responsive
forms. The effect of language such as the second rule of section 2-207(1) is that the response
to an offer is a counter-offer. Should the parties nevertheless subsequently act as though a
contract exists, section 2-207(3) defines the contract terms on the basis of traditional implied-in-fact contract principles.
A largely negative commentary has followed the solution to the battle of the forms
presented in section 2-207(1). I believe this results from the substantive rule the subsection
adopts: people who respond to offers with materially additional or different terms may nevertheless intend to be bound without further negotiation of their differences. This rule converts what should be an interpretive issue into a presumptive rule of law. It follows the
objective theory of contracts by dismissing evidence of actual adverse intent, even actual
adverse intent known to the offeror. True, one may interpret this rule to permit evidence of
actual adverse intent on the question of whether the response was an "expression of acceptance." But a generation of commentary and case law shows this to be no more than a small
possibility.
The hostility to section 2-207(1) bespeaks hostility to the objective theory of contracts.
As with the original Statute of Frauds, this objective strategy may violate the real intentions
and expectations of parties.
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fested an intention to be legally bound. '4 0 Parties who consent to
be bound confer jurisdiction to some adjudicative body."1 Yet, parties who consent to be bound but who leave gaps in their contract
may prefer either no adjudicative jurisdiction or adjudicative jurisdiction.42 The resolution of this question, Barnett says, is possible
either way on logical grounds. 3 But Barnett states:
[B]ecause the concept of consent is a communicative one, we
must always seek the most plausible interpretation of the conduct
of the parties within the relevant community of discourse.
In my judgment, the second of these propositions more accurately expresses the actual intentions of most contracting parties
when they consent to be legally bound."
Consent to be legally bound means a court "may allocate the loss
according to some set of principles.' 5 Still, parties may opt out of
this consent. 4 Absent opt-out, "when courts enforce these back40. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 864-65.
41. Id. at 865.
42. Id.
43. Because "all real world contracts are not completely specified [fully stated], it follows that a consent to be bound entails one of two propositions." Id. at 861 (emphasis
added) (note omitted). The propositions are that consent to be legally bound either does
authorize or does not authorize courts to fill in the gaps. But these two propositions do not
logically follow from the "concept" of consent to be bound unless one defines consent to be
bound to mean both propositions, in which case these are conceptual propositions and are
only so, good as the concept. Barnett's conceptualism fuels this logic. And neither the appeal
to deductive discourse nor what he has to say about his concept is convincing.
If all contracts necessarily have gaps because no client wants to wait until we completely specify everything, or because no one can specify everything, it does not follow that
all gaps deserve to be treated conceptually the same. The U.C.C., for example, separates the
issue of intent to contract from the issue of gaps and permits gap-filling only when there is
intent to contract and a reasonable basis by which to fill the gap. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1990).
Once someone manifests consent to be legally bound, she wants legal enforcement of what
she consented to. The concepts used here beg the critical question: when do I consent to be
legally bound and to what kind of legal enforcement? This problem receives further discussion infra part IV.
44. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 862 (footnote omitted). But why
should this be a matter of anyone's "judgment" if "we must always seek the most plausible
interpretation of the conduct of the parties within the relevant community of discourse"?
Id. If contract law looks to the parties' background, the relevant community to which they
belong, it should not ask rigged questions; it should ask for the whole story. For example,
contract law traditionally has asked whether this is conduct that shows intent to be bound,
but sometimes retreated back to contract law if the answer were yes, the parties intended to
be bound. The same autonomy that shows the good sense in resolving whether the parties
intended to be bound needs to go further. Barnett's seeming reluctance to take this next
step exemplifies the traditional inconsistency of resting contract on a liberal principle of
decentralization yet managing central value judgments. Why should one indulge a central
presumption that the relevant community of discourse will support a court's allocation of
losses in cases of so-called gaps?
45. Id.
46. Id.
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ground rules, 47 they do so with actual, not merely hypothetical,

consensual authorization." '
Because at least some default rules are variable by contracting
parties, Barnett says that "it is unrealistic to depict implied-in-law
default rules as being 'imposed upon' the parties in the tort-like
sense that this phrase has acquired over the years." 9 "Silence in
the face of default rules can constitute an 'indirect' consent to
courts using these default rules to supply terms when a gap exists
in the parties' expression of consent."50
Nevertheless, for most parties silence is consent to some set of
default rules and not to any particular default rule. Parties consent
to particular default rules only when a party had reason to know a
rule and when it would not have been too costly to contract around
the rule. 1 "In the presence of rules that are costly to discover or
contract around, silence is highly ambiguous. It may or may not
signify consent to the imposition of the default rule."52
In the opposite case, where the rules are neither costly to discover nor costly to contract around, consent justifies the enforcement of the existing particular rules on such parties.5 " But where
the parties face substantial costs of discovery or negotiation to cir47. Id.
48. Id. This "consensual authorization" appears to be the same as consent in licensing.
Thus, the parties by consenting to be legally bound actually license the courts to fill in the
gaps. Happily for moral credibility, Barnett does not make the license carte blanche. See id.
at 886.
49. Id. at 865. But if all my consent to be legally bound does is authorize the court to
apply default rules to me, how is my silent choice in this regard more interesting and differentiating than my choice to drive my car runs the risk of my having the law of torts fall
upon me? I could walk, therefore I have given my consensual authorization to tort law and
traffic courts by driving. Why is my choice to contract different than my choice to risk
negligence? Barnett's answer rests on the opportunity that torts does not give me to opt-out
by varying my contract terms. Many of us would also say that the express terms of most
contracts we enter are "imposed" just as much as the law of torts is imposed on us.
50. Id. at 865-66. I do not know whether this "indirect" consent means subjective assent, objectively imputed consent, or assumption of risk/licensing. The quoted text follows
an analogy to evidence law that makes silence in the face of an accusation an admission, Id.
at 865 n.104. I suppose the law of contracts might naturally be expected to have something
itself to say about silence as assent. The dynamic of assent by silence in contract law recognizes some difference between the kind of situation captured by the cited evidence rule and
run-of-the-mill contract activity. Silence is not assent, nor even "indirect" assent under the
Restatement of Contracts section 69, unless exceptional circumstances are present as are
present under the evidence rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979). As to
the expression, indirect assent, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
51. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 866.
52. Id.
53. Id. I understand this to embrace an assumption of risk idea of consent. I assumed
the risk of a bad default rule whenever I could reasonably discover and contract around it.
All that is necessary for my being obligated to this rule is my consent to be legally bound.
Id.
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cumvent a default rule, consent to be legally bound only justifies
particular default rules "if they are of a certain type."5' 4 These
rules must be "conventionalist" default rules-"rules that reflect
the conventional expectations that attach to silence in the relevant
community of discourse." 5 "[W]here there is tacit subjective
agreement between the parties, enforcing default rules that reflect
conventional understanding is likely to reflect subjective assent.""6
Barnett's consent theory has thus begun to develop a theory
for the selection of the rules of contract law. These rules would
close the gap between hypothetical and actual assent.
B. Problems of Consent and Traditional Contract
Consent theory's liberal philosophy endorses freedom of contract as the most practical alternative available to perform the
functions outlined in this theory of justice.17 This confuses a deduction from a theorem with a practical alternative. For no one
can appreciate the problems that Barnett posits without taking the
quasi-deductive inference he offers in praise of consent. If the
54. Id. at 867.
55. Id. at 875.
56. Id. at 900. One cannot posit that a court knows the parties shared a tacit agreement on something, but the court does not know what that tacit agreement is. Thus, the
court has no need for conventional substantive rules which are merely likely to reflect that
subjective assent. Barnett claims "[ilt
is also possible, however, even likely, that there are
mutually shared tacit subjective intentions that cannot be established and that influence the
meaning of what has been manifested." Id. at 877. Barnett assumes that we do not know
what the subjective agreement of the parties was, but he assumes that an agreement exists
and that the relevant community of discourse, such as trade usage, will come closest to the
subjective agreement. Of course, we should apply an available trade usage. But, then, what
is the point of any default rule other than a trade usage-type rule.
In place of shelves of these conventionalist default rules, conventionalism might simply
follow the open-ended methodology of the U.C.C., the songs of reasonable price and the like
under will theory. Eschew this muddled talk of cases in which we know there was a mutual
tacit assumption, but do not know what it is. Only probative evidence of a claim that there
was a tacit assumption the parties shared will back that conclusion. And that evidence will
show what the tacit assumption was. Barnett is uncharacteristically muddled only because
he is resisting his tacit assumption, along with most of the legal community, that will theory
is bad. That is the perceived wisdom from Holmes and Hand no less. But even Holmes and
Hand were glad to have trade usage, and neither would suppose they were imposing a rule
in these cases. Parties choose their own tacit assumptions, their own trade usages, their own
social customs. See infra part V.A.
57. This Barnett claims, and he throws down a gauntlet: "[F]reedom of contract performs ... well enough, in fact, to place the burden on anyone who would undermine this
principle (for whatever reason) to explain how the problems it handles can be handled satisfactorily in some other manner." Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 855 n.73. Other
"practical" devices are available depending on what one means by practical. Modern law
limits freedom of contract arguably as much as it legitimates freedom of contract. If practical alternatives are limited to those that produce efficiency, a voluntary resource transfer
right is all that is implied by the liberal principles.
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problems of knowledge and interest are sufficiently intractable or
sufficiently grave to capture our concern, then a practical alternative to consensualism may not exist. Without serious explanation
Barnett has accepted either the intractability or the gravity of
these issues of social organization. Without this pricing tour de
force, even individuals or associations who hold personal or local
knowledge could not function, because their personal or local
knowledge would not suffice for their decisions on what resources
to trade, what to keep, et cetera. Yet, prices become known and
discoverable such that general knowledge of various resource prices
develops. This general knowledge, conveyed by markets creating
prices and thus known values, could be marshalled by central planning in a variety of ways and projects, as we do daily to constrain
freedom of contract and freedom from contract. To say that no
practical alternative exists to pricing by markets is to ignore the
huge body of law, inter alia, under which without consent we take
by regulation, eminent domain, or the law of torts resources from
one party and give them to another. It may be true that without
some minimum active consensual markets, nonconsensual pricing
would become more difficult in areas such as property, personal
injury, and governmental entitlement and allocational programs.
Yet, there is no activemarket directly in body parts, and thus the
surrogative costs of remediation and rehabilitation are used. That
some "free market" activity facilitates pricing judgments leaves entirely open the issue of how much contract is enough. The decline
of freedom of contract in this century has occurred precisely because any value consensualist efficiency brought was in this matter
or that too high a price. In addition to the problem of knowledge
which impairs central planning, modern contract law rediscovered
another principle of justice: the problem of ignorance.
1.

The Problem of Ignorance

Just as central planning has imperfect information about the
values held by its constituents, its constituents also have imperfect
information. How to value the problem of knowledge over the
problem of ignorance is a first question for political organization.
The only word that describes the choice modern government and
law have made is pragmatism, a focused effort to appreciate that
neither problem has a higher claim. The problem of ignorance
commends political action to ameliorate the effect of market organization on individuals and groups. We pick and choose
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pragmatically and not necessarily correctly.58
Indeed, Barnett's remarks on the choice of default rules separate two kinds of contract actors in conformity with the questions
of knowledge and ignorance. The kinds of default rules a consent
theory of contract may adopt are different when the parties to a
contract are knowledgeable or ignorant of the default rule. Recall
that if the parties either have no reason to know the default rule or
cannot by reasonable cost contract around the default rule, then
the state may only adopt conventional default rules that match
conventional expectations. In contrast, any default rule may be
adopted for knowledgeable parties."9
Even for variable default rules, to endorse a limitation on the
kind of default rule one might legislate is to invite or acquiesce in a
kind of immutable contract rule. Parties who cannot be held to
know and appreciate what their contract documents expressly say
are bound not to unconventional terms, such as price, but only to a
conventional term such as a reasonable price. Facing up to the
problem of ignorance regarding variable default rules because of
the criterion of consent seems to lead to confronting ignorance as
well as to the immutable rules such as one's duty to read what one
signs. More problematically, the question is whether the problem
of ignorance will ever block any conceptually acceptable answer to
when people are legally bound. Modern contract development once
focused on the general question of "when," but now focuses on the
more pragmatic question "to what" do these appearances of consent agree to be bound, as in the modern doctrine of
unconscionability.6 0
As the consent theory has been presented, as a structural representation of a theory of contract justice, it could be seen from, so
to speak, the outside. Its key structural parts combined local empowerment as a solution to a stipulated problem of knowledge as
well as a requirement that rules be promulgated so that they might
be known in advance. As to these two structural requirements,
Professor Richard Crasswell observed that this consent theory
along with others, such as Fried's will theory of promising,6 1 left
unguided the choice of what the contract rules might be, as though
a philosophy of contract that did not provide guidance as to the
appropriate rules might be indifferent to or irrelevant for the sub58. The right theory of contract cannot solve the policy questions involved in the right
theory of social justice.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
60. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
61. See FRIED, supra note 12.
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stance of the rules.02 Apparently Crasswell's critique led Barnett to
3
elaborate his theory in Sound of Silence."
Consent theory confines the default rule-making power as follows: the default rules of contract law must be knowable in advance and variable by parties at reasonable cost. This promulgation principle is the second principle of the consent theory.
Presumably the variability point merely mines the message of the
first principle, the knowledge principle, which empowers those
with better or local knowledge to contract as they wish. Furthermore, the promulgation principle requires that default rules be
substantively in accord with the consent notion.
Barnett claims his consent theory explains contract doctrines
such as consideration." ' Consideration doctrine, of course, is part
of the pantheon of contract law, the immutable, invariable rules of
contract law. What the contents of that immutable law of contracts
should be is, of course, at least as important as what default rules
should fill in gaps in agreements already marked by contract law as
valid. Because a theory of consent as licensing by knowledgeable
parties justifies any contract default rules, it would apparently follow that the same form of consent should justify any contract law.
That seems nonsensical. Consent is important to justify the enforcement of default rules, says Barnett. Barnett calls for default
rules that are most likely the rules which parties tacitly assumed-conventionalist rules; this furthers a weak or soft form of
consent. If one thought there were anything to the idea behind the
62. Richard Crasswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 523-528 (1989).
63. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 874.
64. Barnett identifies the miserable history of controversy over the bargain principle
as applied to issues like nominal consideration and claims for his consent theory a norm
which surpasses the bargain principle. Barnett's consent theory, however, retains the idea
that parties autonomously choose to be bound. Only by presuming that parties to nominal
consideration agreements do intend to be bound does Barnett's theory permit him to overthrow the controversy. But the factual intent issue does not change whether we ask whether
the widow really bargained for the deceased's worthless notes or whether the formal bargaining behavior evidences her intent to be bound. The question has been whether, on this
borderland of contract behavior, the parties intended to be bound. The bargain principle
cannot uncontroversially manage these cases that put into question whether there really was
a bargain. Similarly, if Barnett would hypothesize a nominal consideration case in which he
did not know whether the parties intended to be bound, his theory could not resolve that
case in any simple manner. Barnett's theory also would leave the case to the jury. That he
would then need to call upon other aspects of his theory to do the job would not ensure that
it would rule all nominal consideration bargain cases in the same way. If consent theory left
disarray in the cases, I would not doubt the consent theory as I believe experience shows
that nominal consideration cases are as likely to bear parties who did not intend to be
bound as those who did. See Barnet, Consent, supra note 2, at 312; infra text accompanying
note 102.
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weak form of consent or any real consensualism, one would not
need to create default rules based on suppositions about what parties most likely mutually and tacitly intended. Perhaps because
one grudgingly accepts the attribution of weak consent, one turns
to conventionalist default rules. If a stronger form of consent will
inform the choice of default rules, and if these default rules can be
located, then being bound to contract default rules may be plausibly different from my being bound to the tax law. That these con6
ventionalist rules are not obviously available goes without saying. 5
That finding these substantive rules does not erode the principle of
local knowledge, or autonomy, will be a surprise.
A perhaps different kind of approach to consent would choose
nonsubstantive rules of the sort the U.C.C. often uses, essentially
empty phrases telling the court to find out what the parties' subjective agreement most likely had been: a reasonable price, a reasonable time for delivery, et cetera. For if the strategy of conventionalist rules is "to reduce the probable discrepancy between the
actual subjective agreement of the parties and the default rules,"6 6
adopting a substantive rule is unnecessary except for the sake of
having a rule. Let the arbitrators, lawyers, courts, or juries do their
best to discover the actual subjective agreement.
Yet liberalism is not egalitarian in its quest for individual empowerment until everyone either knows the rules (of contract, for
example) or has the capacity to know these rules. 7 Even if everyone knows these rules and the promulgation principle is met, however, to be truly individual-empowering, these rules must all be variable or there must not be any rules. For if central planning does
not know how best to allocate the goods in society, central planning a fortiori does not know any true rules of law that will allocate in disputes some of the goods in society. Thus, all of central
planning's rules will have to be variable by parties in their contracts.6 A liberal theory of contract such as Barnett's leads to one
characteristic of contract rules: they are always variable or mutable
and none may be a true rule of law-one to which we are obliged
regardless of a contractual provision otherwise.
Hierarchical ignorance, which is the problem of personal and
local knowledge, means that individuals and not states should
65. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 906-11.
66. Id. at 882.
67. One might join those who insist that empowerment is merely academic until everyone shares the resources sufficiently to participate.
68. The U.C.C. gap-fillers find, for the most part, a comfortable anarchic path in their
substantive emptiness: nonsubstantive default rules. Liberalism can favor only these. See
infra part V.C. Central planning can know only these kinds of rules.
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make the rules of contract. Experience suggests that giving free
rein to individual contract actors often produces abuse in one form
or another. Liberalism has reacted to this experience by promoting
the idea of limits to freedom of contract and has endorsed doctrines such as duress and unconscionability that are said typically
to "police" the bargain. In so doing liberalism has resisted the
more consistent idea that people who know better what their contracts should be also know better when their contracts should not
be enforced. By embracing a law of contracts and yet also a doctrine of contract-excuse, liberalism needs to explain why individual
knowledge is not best exploited by an individual's retaining the
right to exit from a contract as freely as entering a contract.
A classic approach to this question has been to require consent
of both parties to both contract formation and contract rescission.
Yet with liberal principles of knowledge, it would be more consistent in my view to permit the same knowledge to operate evenly
throughout the contractual relationship. Thus, those who have discovered after the fact that they have made a bad bargain might be
thought free, by this way of thinking, 9 to repudiate their remaining promises. To bar this premise of contracting supposes that
more good comes from enforcing the bad bargain than not. Who
claims to make that judgment better than an individual promisor?
The answer is, only the two parties to an agreement.
2.

The Question of Contract Substance

The problem of ignorance troubles the claim that contract better organizes resource use. Rational actors back the market idea.
Tapping personal or local knowledge of all actors taps ignorance
and knowledge. The most efficient allocation of resources that a
market will presumably create depends on the proper assumption
of rationality. This leads to the best use of resources and produces
more wealth. Not surprisingly, therefore, consent theory rests on
the maximization of wealth. Freedom of contract, then, might be
said to represent the best method to obtain more wealth. However,
the general idea of contract as a state-legitimized transfer right
cannot prescribe the kind of contract law even a state bent on
wealth-maximization should adopt. The right to trade resources
69. I am not proposing a general ad hoc right of exit. Only this: that a will theory can
support doctrines such as duress and unconscionability. The previously cited passage from
Llewellyn shows how unconscionability may arise from the idea of actual assent, and not
merely from distributive notions. Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 370. Cf. Kronman, supra note
8, at 477-97. Duress may receive like analysis and justification, but only on a will theory in
which actual expectations matter.
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backed by state recognition of the transfer is all that efficiency
may require. While this does seem to support the element of consent as Barnett claims, this need not entail any further implications about contract law. Thus, consistent with efficiency or
wealth-maximization, a state might recognize only barters. Enforcement of uncompleted barters or the law of contracts as we
know it is neither logically entailed by the premise of consent nor
materially entailed by efficiency theory. 70 The most efficient institutional framework for any society depends on the features of that
society. Contract law would only succeed in serving a fundamental
purpose of deterring opportunistic behavior, with an ethic against
opportunism. In the popular language of default rules, only when
efficiency is fully specified will we see everything that efficiency intends. Thus, any particular doctrine of contracts is extrinsic to
consent and efficiency. Without executory contracts, for example,
fewer occasions exists for default rules. Promises or promising are
consistent with a consensual property transfer system that produces the informational benefit of a resource pricing. But this informational benefit might be achieved by many routes. Thus, a
practical alternative to the common law theory of contract may be
a barter theory or a reliance theory. These may produce the benefits of ordering actions that appear to be required by the problems
of knowledge, interest and communication. The quality of individual choice might be achieved by a variety of exchange or transfer
systems.7 1
Indeed, to speak about contract law beyond barter-recognition
is to surpass economic theory and bespeaks faith and not science.
It is to talk like Charles Fried about trust and respect and other
moral values. It is to talk like Ronald Dworkin about wealth-maximization as a value. 7s A philosophy of contract law cannot rest on
70. Some may find these remarks controversial, but I do not mean to stir the pot.
Judge Posner, for example, holds the view that contract law has the "fundamental function.
. . to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order
to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity." POSNER, supra note 4, at 91. Posner
quickly points out that what constitutes opportunistic behavior is a problem of interpretation. Id. Posner also ranks parties' intention above putative efficiency. Id. at 93.
71. Long-term contractual relationships are manifest in a variety of legal formats such
that if contract law per se abandoned the executory contract, which seems so essential to
long-term relationships, little would change in our business and social practices. Most obvious is the corporation in which parties join together to achieve the benefits of a long-term
association but also acquire further rights against the parties with whom in essence they are
contracting by altering the contractual or arms-length paradigmatic relation into a fiduciary
set of standards.
72. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). Cf.
Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/1

26

Kalevitch: Gaps in Contracts

CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY

1993]

an efficacious functional account of how contract might fit within a
transfer system. Embedded within an institution like contract are
other goals and values that might, in any given case, trump transfer values. 3
Liberal principles argue for a consensual transfer system and
do not imply promissory enforcement. These principles do not independently suggest an entirely or even a largely consensual transfer system, and so cannot determine how pure or how mixed an
economy might be and still provide the "encoded knowledge"
prices convey about resource use.
IV.

CONSENT THEORY: ASSENT AND CONSIDERATION

Objective theories of contract typically confront conflicting
purposes. Barnett's consent theory would rest -the moral basis of
contract on the consent of the parties. Nevertheless, consent is not
the will of the parties but manifested consent. Unfortunately for a
meaningful moral basis in consent, contract law might find anything a person voluntarily does to be a manifestation of consent.
Manifested consent must correspond with actual consent to secure
the primacy of consent. Barnett's consent theory holds that contract obligation requires something more fundamental than concepts of will, reliance, bargain, efficiency, or fairness. 4
A framework or theory is needed to order these fundamental concerns, to show where each "principle" stands in relation to others.
• . . The process of contractual transfer cannot be completely
comprehended, therefore, without considering more fundamental
issues, namely the nature and sources of individual75entitlements
and the means by which they come to be acquired.
Barnett explains the meaning of an entitlements or rights theory
as follows:
The principal task of legal theory, then, is to identify circumstances when legal enforcement is morally justified.
Entitlements theories seek to perform this task by using
moral analysis to derive individual legal rights .... A theory of
contractual obligation is the part of an entitlements theory that
focuses on liability arising
from the wrongful interference with a
76
valid rights transfer.
73. That contracts are vitiated by fraud, duress, and other so-called concepts of invalidation may be said either to arise from transfer values or subordinate transfer values.
74. Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 293.
75. Id. at 293-94.
76. Id. at 296.
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This entitlements theory of contract requires consent from the
rights holders to transfers. "[A] valid transfer of rights must be
conditioned on some act of the rights holder ....
[L]egal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights.""
But this consent theory may only appear to look like a will
theory of contract. It is not.7" The difference, it is said, is fundamental: "A will theory bases contractual obligation on the fact that
an obligation was freely assumed. . . . [A will theory] is hard
pressed to justify contractual obligation in the absence of an actual
exercise of the will."7 9 Thus, says Barnett, will theory creates inevitable tension in that people must be able to rely on appearances,
apparent manifestations of assent.8 0 Because consent theory rests
on a rights theory, it can do what will theory cannot: "account for
the normal objective-subjective relationship in contract law." 8'
Rights theory specifies boundaries between areas in which people
can operate. Rights theory "demands that the boundaries of protected domains be ascertainable, not only by judges who must resolve disputes that have arisen, but, perhaps more importantly, by
' 82
the affected persons themselves before any dispute occurs.
The mechanism for this boundary function is, as one might
expect, the objective theory of contract. The consent that is required for a transfer of rights is a "manifestation of an intent to
alienate rights." 3 In contract one "incurs a contractual obligation
to perform only when she manifests to a promisee her intention to
be legally bound. The basis of contractual obligation is not promising per se. The basis of contract is consent." 84
A.

Correspondence of Manifested and Actual Consent

Promising is an objective manifestation of a ,possible, even
likely, intent to be bound. No one has claimed that promising is
legally sufficient. Not even Charles Fried believes that a promise is
legally sufficient. On the same page that Barnett states that consent is the basis of contract, Barnett cites Fried for having care77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 300.
at
at
at
at
at
at

300-01.
300.
301.
302.
304.
305.
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fully said that a promisor incurs a moral obligation because she
intentionally invokes a social convention whose purpose is to cause
others to expect the promised performance.8 5 It is not legal theory
that has created the boundary-defining functions of either the social conventions of promising or promising that is serious enough
to create legal obligation. Contract follows society and not viceversa. Barnett supports this proposition by announcing that intention to contract, or consent as he calls it, may be evidenced by a
variety of behaviors that turn out to be the actions by which contract law has striven to find obligation. 6 Intention to contract or
what Barnett calls "manifested consent" does all the work in his
theory, but like contract doctrine, he cannot provide any further
explanation of this "boundary-definer" except to explain its function. In Sound of Silence, Barnett later says this of manifested
consent:
I postpone for now the important issue of how manifested consent is related to subjective assent. Suffice it to say that, for me, a
manifested consent can be "real" even when it is not accompanied by subjective assent. This is because the concept of consent
that is at the root of contract theory is communicated consent,
is
though one reason for the centrality of communicated consent
8 7
its close empirical correspondence with subjective assent.
The sole reason why communicated consent is at the deeper
root of contract is that we presuppose that communication is successful. If our legal ideas did not match the subjective intentions of
parties' contracts, contracts would betray Fried's will theory and
Barnett's consent theory, as well as the liberty principle that backs
both. Were objective and subjective intention not empirically close,
contract would be a random transfer system and not a voluntary
enterprise. What little we have in the way of law about objective
manifestations of intent to contract, may err in application to parties in lawsuits. Legal theory should test legal presuppositions,
such as particular manifestations of intent, against what parties actually mean. Formulations of contract rules of law, mutable or variable rules of law, about manifestations of assent or about mundane damages rules create grave risks. Contract law lacks much in
the way of clear and precise rules about intent to contract for the
best of reasons: parties provide that information. Off-the-rack rules
of contractual intention do not fit. 88
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 309-19.
Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 859 n.81.
The noisy debate about the "battle of the forms" since the U.C.C.'s conception
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In two critical respects, theories like Barnett's consent theory
of contract (and property) cannot explain or justify contract law
for a dynamic or pluralistic society. First, by setting forth a formal
theory about which agreements courts should enforce (those in
which formal, manifested consent is present), consent theory must
offer definition to the phrase "manifested consent." Consent theory rests merely on the largely uninformative formal statement
that courts enforce agreements in which parties have manifested
consent.8 9 Any definition of manifested consent can fit within that
statement. That may be all one means by a formal statement. Contract doctrine has traditionally used "intent to contract" in this
way.
Second, the modern problem of contract law has been-the lack
of consensus on what, if any, formal or informal, legal or social,
conventions may be trusted under the objective theory of manifested consent. Thus, if everyone believed that conventions like
shaking hands, recitals of consideration, or bargains actually reflected the subjective assent of the parties, a formal theory might
become breezily practical by adopting conventions such as contractual consent. Once conventions become controversial, as in quantum physics where presently experiments show both that quantum
entities exhibit behavior of waves but also particles, 90 and as in
contract, which now entertains serious doubts about conventions
like recitals of consideration and bargains, these formal concepts of
intent to contract lose both explanatory and justificatory force.
Barnett defines manifested consent, or the conditions under
which courts will enforce promised exchanges, by referring to
traditional contract doctrine as to what promises will be enforced,
such as bargain theory of consideration and promissory reliance.
This is likely to offend the intuition of a lawyer who has been
trained to separate the concept of consent from the concept of consideration. But the formal statement is not objectionable on that
ground. Convenient analytical separations made for the purpose of
learning contract law need not confine the different purpose of theattempts to comprehend and critique the drafter's apparent willingness to impose off-therack terms onto contract parties. What must be noticed about all of that is that section 2207 first requires contractual intention. Section 2-207(1) provides the threshold test of intent to contract by requiring either an acceptance or a confirmation. As in section 2-204(3),
the Code does not impute any terms to parties who refrain from manifesting assent. Further, the Code's creative ambivalence on supplementary terms such as warranty, may be a
rejection of the general idea of particular, substantive off-the-rack rules and reflect a will
theory premise. Compare U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990) with U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), (3) (1990).
89. This formal statement is not wholly without value. It separates contracts from
tort, restitution, and crime, among others.
90. John Horgan, Quantum Philosophy, Sci. Am., July 1992, at 94, 96.
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oretically specifying the necessary conditions of legal enforcement.
Likewise, what lawyers take as necessary for legal enforcement is
very strong evidence of what should be included in a detailed formal statement. But a general, formal statement may incorporate
offer and acceptance, consideration, capacity, and the myriad contract doctrines, into a simple formal word or phrase.
That this is Barnett's intention appears both from his rejection of any one of the lawyer's grounds for enforcing agreements
and from his accepting the several positive grounds for enforcement as prima facie evidence of legally enforceable agreements. 1
Almost all of the theories of contract Barnett rejects as inferior to
his consent theory find their way into his theory, which he claims
rescues these useful legal arrangements [e.g., nominal consideration] from their present uncertain status in contract law. By providing a clear, common-sense test of enforceability that avoids the
need for courts to distinguish "reasonable" from "unreasonable"
reliance in determining whether a contract was formed, a consent
theory enables parties to calculate better who bears the risk of
reliance and,92 hence, facilitates reliance on interpersonal
commitments.

For the moral basis of legal enforcement of contract is consent.9 3 "lClonsent of the rights holder to be legally obligated is the
moral component that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of
alienable rights in a system of entitlements."9 ' But what is consent? Again Barnett too cryptically offers a manifestation of an intent to be legally bound.5 Further, this manifestation of intent to
be bound must be communicated, and so an objective test of interpretation of when parties intend to be legally bound is necessary
and arguably required by the word "manifested." Barnett rests his
case for the objective test on the familiar, practical ground that
''we never have direct access to another individual's subjective
mental state." 96 He does not rest on any moral theory, such as utilitarianism, which might render the will of an individual immaterial. Had he direct access to an individual's subjective mental
state, that would evidently animate consent. Still, to say formally
what contract law has said for generations, that consent must be
manifested and must portray an intent to be legally bound, lacks
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 313-19.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 299 (notes omitted).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
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substance. For any voluntary action by an individual might be
thought to qualify as sufficient consent: "The hard work facing any
legal system based on entitlements includes determining what constitutes 'valid' title and what acts constitute 'consent.' Only when
these concepts are properly defined can we 'expect' the legal system to act in a predictable enough manner to make our reliance
'reasonable' or 'justified.' ,,97
But how are the acts that constitute consent to be defined? If
they are to be defined by the legal system, and this really is hard
work, perhaps this signals the lack of a moral basis in consent. The
channeling function of a formality, such as the contract under seal,
may serve a legal system's definition of consent. Likewise, the consent theory differs from the "current rule that the falsity of...
[recitals of consideration] permits a court to nullify a transaction
because of a lack of consideration." 8 That the present rule of nominal consideration is "contrary to a consent theory"9 9 is apparently
the promised rescue of "useful legal arrangements.' ' 10 0 But if consent is a manifestation of intent to be legally bound, the only legally useful aspect of nominal consideration is that it portrays that
manifestation of intent to be legally bound. Barnett assumes this
portrayal to correspond with actual intentions of parties. But no
channeling function succeeds unless this is true.
1. Consideration
Whether the function of a formal concept, such as the seal or
nominal consideration, has served the channeling function of consent is a question of correspondence of the formality with the actual intentions of the parties. These formal concepts fail when social consensus about their significance breaks down or is never
achieved. The demise of consensus is the end of the convention
that was the sole justification for believing the legal idea of consent
corresponded with the behavior of contract parties. Whether the
formal symbol in play is a handshake over a barrel head, a seal, or
a recital of legal gibberish, the symbol can never determine
whether actors understand the formality in the way in which someone else might. The ambivalent attitude of the two Restatements
of Contracts on nominal consideration suggests the breakdown of
consensus on that particular formal means of manifesting assent to
be legally bound. If it is true that consensus has failed (or never
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 271.
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existed), and philosophy cannot answer that question without evidence about what people who use the formal symbol subjectively
intend, then Barnett has not rescued the doctrine of nominal consideration at all. For all a philosopher can know, recitals of consideration like any other token of formal assent may be an instrument
of oppression or expression. In advocating the enforceability of
nominal consideration, Barnett risks having law enforce agreements for reasons other than the actual consent of parties who use
a formal symbol. Although the contrary recommendations of the
current Restatement view are no more clearly correct than Barnett's, perhaps the personal experiences and knowledge of many
lawyers and judges surpass the views of any one of us. In any case,
if the use of nominal consideration is controversial, it cannot serve
the channeling role Barnett expects '01 unless these cases are handled cautiously. That is the effect, and likely intent, of the change
in the Restatement rule.
Moreover, the widest lesson to be drawn from the newer Restatement's pervasive shift from rule to principles or standards,
strikes more deeply into the heart of Barnett's quest to build a
formal transfer and entitlements theory of contract. It was not
merely that a few contract conventions had broken down during
the period after the first Restatement revolutionized contract law.
The revolution affected the fundamental way law was conceived.
Formalities are not inherently good or bad, we learned. Like guns,
formalities can be misused. Only legal sociology can discover
whether the actual behavior of parties converges with consensual
formalities like a rule validating nominal consideration.
These lessons are lost when philosophy supposes that any concept-be it manifested consent or quantum theory-matches reality. A concept works when it captures what it seeks. Manifested
consent cannot explain any nominal consideration case for a society itself unsure of the consensual significance of any or particular
magic words. It may be no more significant, in fact, than that the
parties signed the document or even that a document exists. Either
we have good evidence that certain conduct is a convention of consent or we should be cautious until the evidence affirms one or an101. Barnett takes another position that, in philosophical language, can only be contingently true: that parties do not consent in a meaningful way to so-called "invisible"
terms. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 889-90. But if formal statements of consent could capture the reality of a particular manifestation of consent, as by signing one is
bound because of the "duty to read," parties would in fact consent to "invisible" terms.
They would appreciate their commitment to even obscure and unexpected terms buried in
the fine print.
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other view." 2 ,
Any selection a theory commends of particular facts from the
welter of facts the world presents must relate to the theory's purpose. A consent theory must, of course, select conventional behavior that exhibits consent. But the nagging problem of common
sense is that it supports both recognizing nominal consideration
and ignoring nominal consideration, as the diversity of contract
law demonstrates. Thus, to say that the rules of contract law
should be conventional and commonsensical is to support everything. That is why the only solution that can make sense for consensual contracts is will theory guided by a list of commonsense
factors. That is why contract law cannot settle the question once
and for all of contracts of nominal consideration and the rest of
the concepts that try to capture consent. This is also why all formal concepts, including the objective theory of contracts, cannot
always be presumed to have enduring usefulness.
2.

Intent to Contract

What has happened in the revolution in contract law, the real
mortality of contract, has been the loss of faith in the objective
test. Why is it that signing a contract cannot suffice, for Barnett
and so many of us, to bind one to obscure and unexpected terms,
"invisible" terms? Because we think that no consensual link exists
between the formality of signing and true consent to the troubling
contract term. The objective manifestation of consent to be legally
bound diverges, we think, from the actual subjective assent of the
parties.' °
But Barnett cannot both insist that conventional, commonsensical contract rules square with his consent theory and explain why
one conventional, commonsensical expectation deserves less respect than another. To say that Drafter's expectation is worth less,
that it is illegitimate, requires a showing that Drafter knew or
should have known the contrary conventional common sense of the
other party. But this is circular because Signer, who claims the
term was invisible, must now show why the term was invisible and
why she did not and should not have known Drafter's expectation.
102. Barnett may be correct about the recital of consideration as a sufficient ground of
contract enforcement on a theory of moral deserts. One willing to sign a paper with this
gibberish deserves a penalty. But consent and not deserts is his theory.
103. If one assumes that the put-upon party has no idea or expectation of the invisible
term and that the contract drafter knows this, there may be no legitimate expectation that
the term has received the other's consent. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at
890 n.183.
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Common sense cannot choose between two commonsensical
norms.1 04 When conventions break down, objective tests do also.
To insist on the objective test of manifested assent requires one to
abandon true consent as the moral basis of contract law so long as
the consent conventions are controversial. Like all substantive
rules, manifested consent must choose a priori to believe the story
of Drafter or Signer. The alternative is to entrust the common
sense of judges and juries. In the end neither we nor Barnett can
have both. For the will theorist this is no problem. Knowing that
no rules can promise a priori to capture parties' intentions and expectations, the will theorist resists rules and theories of human behavior, hoping thereby to animate and empower the contracting
parties. For the entitlement theorist who would place contract in
the larger setting of transfer law, this could also be true. For the
legal theorist who sees the function of law as governing human
conduct by rules, but who finds consent in the well of moral justification, manifested consent is problematical. A legal theorist must
keep the pocket part of conventional consent practices handy to
revise his rules as practices shade in one direction or another. Another legal theorist might leave the issue to the parties and their
evidence.
V.

CENTRAL PLANNING'S DEFAULT RULES

A paradox of liberal legal theory haunts contract law and theory: If the autonomy of contracting parties surpasses the authority
of central planning, how might central planning enact rules of contract law? The default rule school of thought apparently resolves
the problem by providing rules of contract law that the parties
may vary. Variable or mutable rules of contract law will apply only
if the parties do not agree otherwise. When parties do not otherwise agree, they are assumed to assent to the default rules. Under
this weak notion of assent, central planning may both bring administrative order and yet animate autonomy if only for sophisticated parties. For sophisticated parties variable default rules present opportunities both for empowering their will and for
overpowering the unsophisticated. Choosing the variable default
rules as well as the invariable or immutable rules of contract law
requires one to confront this tension between empowerment and
oppression. Barnett sensibly suggests that a consent theory of con104. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 261, 299-301 (1985) (discussing the trade-offs between interpretive modes and "plain
language").
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tract favors default rules that most likely mirror what the parties
actually agreed to. He imagines two kinds of cases, cases of subjective agreement and cases of subjective disagreement. Recognizing
in the latter that no default rule can mirror what the parties did
not agree to, Barnett's consent theory favors default rules that will
provide incentives for getting the parties to agree. These incentives
may take the form of penalty default rules.
First, I will discuss this curious idea of default rules for cases
of subjective agreement. Then, the perhaps more curious idea of
building subjective agreements by penalty default rules receives
due attention.
A.

Default Rules for Subjective Agreements

Barnett has found two traditional legal criteria by which the
consent theory helps decide the appropriate default rules. He
makes no claim that consent theory alone decides the right default
rules-merely that these considerations flow from the account of
consent theory. First, Barnett finds that conventionalist default
rules flow from the consent account because of the need for contractual 'enforcement to reflect the actual subjective agreement of
the parties. Where the parties have left a gap in their expressed
agreement, they may have in fact shared the same tacit assumption. Barnett supposes this would arise from their sharing participation in a particular community which conventionally would handle a particular issue in the way the parties subjectively assumed
the law would have.
Assuming the case in which the parties' objective indicia
would show a gap in their agreement but also assuming actual subjective agreement of the parties, Barnett notes that the objective
theory of contract is inapposite to this problem. The objective theory manages the cases of actual or subjective disagreement of parties. The objective theory of assent cannot guide the choice to the
better default rule for the situation of actual subjective agreement.
But the consent theory does help in this case because it will favor a
conventionalist default rule. Barnett claims a conventionalist default rule will more likely come closer to the parties' subjective
agreement. He does not claim that a conventionalist default rule
will come closer to the parties' subjective agreement than would a
factual hearing.
The issue raised is how contract law might help to choose the
default rule for the gap in the agreement when the parties subjectively agree. The answer given by Barnett is that conventionalist
default rules are more likely than any other default rules to get
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/1
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closer to the parties actual subjective agreement.'0 5 Additionally,
not only will these default rules get us closer to the real agreement,
they "will lead to fewer interpretive mistakes" when gaps need to
be filled.'10 This argument claims more broadly that courts will get
to the right answer and not merely closer to the right answer.
Barnett then turns to an apparently0 7 immutable default
rule' 1 8 to illustrate this point."0 9 That he should do so is curious
because the only reason we Should seek to enact a default rule better than other prospective default rules would be to give parties
the default rule that is most likely closest to their actual subjective
agreement. An immutable or background rule, such as a good faith
performance rule, hardly serves this objective unless one knows
that all contracting parties do agree to a particular immutable
rule." 0 Under consent theory, local knowledge is more likely to
105. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 880. Barnett's discussion of default
rules and subjective agreement addresses only the situation in which the subjective agreement cannot be shown. Only because we have all been trained against subjective agreement
could we suppose one could both conclude there was a subjective agreement about a contract term and yet not have sufficient evidence of what that agreement was.
106. Id. at 882.
107. Parties may agree to fair play standards that differ from those someone else understands as good faith performance under will theory. That is what most conventional legal
writing means by commencing with statements such as "good faith is not easy to define."
Objective theory continues to seek to promulgate the same for everyone as though central
planning knows everything. But if central planning knew everything, in most instances no
contracting would exist.
108. Barnett also gives examples from agency and partnership law, which I do not
evaluate here.
109. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 882-85.
110. Barnett makes this point in a penultimate section that merits attention. Id. at
905. Barnett points out that a market in legal jurisdictions would provide the basis for consent to immutable contract rules. Moreover, he begs the real consent, actual assent, by assuming because there is a market and people participate in the market, they actually assent
to all market transactions. Barnett had already embraced an inscrutable conventionalist law
of contract because he had acknowledged that some people (rationally uninformed people)
may not mean what contract law ascribes to them. But a market in legal jurisdictions cannot
solve the ignorance problem, any more than excessive formalities can.
The final section of Sound of Silence, titled "Common Sense and Common Law," suggests that surrogates for the absence market in legal jurisdictions might be found in moral
theory or economic analysis. Id. at 906-11. But moral theory had already led Barnett to
recognize the difficulties with just a market theory. Moral theory required that transfers be
voluntary or actually assented to. The market showed it did not guarantee that actual
assent.
The problem of immutable contract rules has perhaps influenced a number of legal and
quasi-legal developments that might offer more hope for the problem of consent to immutable rules. First, we should not be blind to the steady decline over the past half-century in
repute of immutable rules (and the covert climb of will theory), as for example in the doctrine and rules of consideration. Second, all these immutable rules require interpretation
and in that process may be tailored to particular litigants and their expectations. Third,
lawyers have been escaping immutable rules by specifying choice of law clauses and moving
clients into more subjectively congruent legal concepts since the idea of law arose. We might
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lead to the truth of the subjective agreement. Instead, consent theory suggests, without explaining, why central planning and not the
conventional rule of the relevant community of discourse should
have jurisdiction over the issue of how one should interpret contractual obligations. Moreover, consent theory suggests that those
immutable legal rules of contract get us closer to parties' subjective
agreements.
Contract law has nothing substantive to offer cases in which
the parties subjectively agreed. If the parties had been in subjective agreement, assumedly at the time of contracting, and are now
in dispute about what they had subjectively agreed, two assumptions arise. First, either the court knows by a factual finding of this
previous subjective agreement or, second, it does not know. In either event Barnett's claim for the consent theory must fail.
If the court knows of the subjective agreement, then no default rule matters to the resolution of a dispute. Where parties
have an ascertainable subjective agreement, no gap exists for default rules to fill. Thus, a claim that any theory of contract can
contribute to the substance of default rules that will provide better
outcomes than alternative default rules cannot be established
under the first assumption, that the court has determined what the
agreement was. 11 '
If the parties' actual agreement is disputed, there is a real opportunity to discover the subjective agreement better than any
possible default rules. Another approach is better than Barnett's
conventional default rule and better than asking the court to
choose the meaning or the term the parties most likely would have
chosen, in effect placing itself in the same position as the parties
when they made their agreement.112 Rather, the court should listen
to the parties' evidence supporting their version of the actual
make too much of contract as the sole instrument of satisfying parties' shared goals. Finally,
though the list could go further, in recent years the rise of specialized legal areas as well as
arbitration has perhaps occurred in some part because the market has responded to a general contract law that is unresponsive to particular party needs. These may be emerging
contract-resolution markets. People may go to these markets because contract law would
not recognize the more individuated contract interpretations that parties prefer.
111. It would be possible but meager to claim that the consent theory influenced the
default rule of party-autonomy which led to revealing the parties' subjective agreement.
Consent theory is beside the point as to the creation of this rule because consent theory, he
has said, is not a will theory. Barnett, Consent, supra note 2, at 300-01. But if that would be
the claim for consent theory, then such a pan-default rule converts consent theory into a
will theory.
112. The text on this good faith duty rule could concern subjective agreement of what
a term in the contract means or what an objectively unexpressed but subjectively agreedupon term is. I assume either as a possibility.
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agreement. This is nonsubstantive, meaning that neither party is
favored or disfavored a priori under the rule in light of their attributes. "Bring evidence" is the canon of will theory-be it self-serving testimony, prior dealings with the promisor, or proof of general
or eccentric practice. The fact-finding task is Herculean only if we
should expect the court to come up with the right answer. Under
our current expectations, it is the daily practice of courts to interpret the conduct of the actors whose intentions are at issue. In will
theory the rule is party autonomy.
No doubt the approach of will theory will not achieve congruence with the parties' subjective agreement in every case. In this
imperfect world in which evidence of what truly happened may be
missing, justice will not be done in every case of tort, crime, or
contract. But the will theory approach to an imperfect world of
contract interpretation succeeds in the only relevant aspiration.
Will theory tries to do the job of implementing the moral basis of
contract obligation. Default rules renounce actual intention for
fear of wrongly doing the job and in that renunciation guarantee
that the job will sometimes not be done. Will theory surpasses any
substantive immutable rule. The default rule I propose is, of
course, a basic part of modern and classical contract law and
merely moves the judge from legal hypothesizing to adjudicating
the facts.
Suppose for example, that Sam and Belle have a shared cutthroat morality about business and contracts. Everyone knows
they play the contract game as close to the edge of conventional
decency imaginable. Good faith performance for them is no more
than self-interested opportunism. Sam and Belle read their contracts narrowly and strive to do only what they are expressly required. None of this finds its way into their written deals, but each
is well aware of the other's disposition. Sam and Belle execute a
written contract that either leaves the meaning of an express term
unclear or makes no provision about a term that ordinarily parties
would have expressed. Sam and Belle eventually dispute their obligations under the deal. Sam's version relies on a notion of good
faith in which opportunism is permissible; Belle's version makes
opportunism impermissible.
To rule that Sam and Belle's conception of good faith performance is the same as the paradigm of the U.C.C.'s duty of good
faith and general contract law is to fail to grasp the most correct
interpretation of their subjective agreement, but instead to proPublished by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1993
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pound for Sam and Belle an imaginary commercial morality."'3 If
this good faith morality was in fact perceived by the promulgators
of modern contract law, it nevertheless does not hold for Sam and
Belle whose tacit assumption was otherwise. Interpreting their intentions on the basis of "good faith" tacit assumptions cannot produce fewer interpretive errors unless the perception of Sam and
Belle held by modern contract law is correct: that they are the odd
people out.
I do not know why Barnett or traditional contract accords reality to this particular conception of modern contract law. Approval of this default rule as immutable rests on the supposition
that no one would agree to a term other than "good faith performance" except under involuntary consent. Alternatively, approval of
such a default rule rests on nonconsensual contract theory which
consent theory does not inform. The latter is immaterial to this
discussion of consent theory's effects on the choice of default rules.
The former would only be a fair supposition if we have the knowledge that some greater number of people would not voluntarily
agree otherwise, and that greater number somehow, under consent
theory, counts sufficiently. What we have, instead, is an inference
from the legal conception of good faith about what the rest of the
world is like. The world is composed, however, of people who either do or do not, in varying degrees, tacitly assume that all
promisors share a good faith morality.
Consent theory should resist legislating the best rule of law
given the uncertainty about what is best. Were local knowledge animating the consent theory, it would resist avoidable rules of law
such as immutable default rules. Without evidence that our theoretical inclinations are supported by the facts of the real world, we
are all inclined to substitute our own view of what we think is most
likely. Those acculturated by the regnant legal system to believe
good faith should be the way buyers and sellers behave hardly suggests that we capture any or all of their tacit assumptions on that
matter." 4 What Barnett proves about the substantive impact of
113. Barnett claims that a good faith conception, such as the surrender of opportunities bargained-away in making the contract, provides a response to those who deny any
"universal conventional understanding" that contracts must be performed in good faith.
Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 883 n.163. Perhaps it is enough to say that if
something is universal, it is not conventional-and vice-versa.
114. The problem with good faith as Barnett apprehends the legal idea is this: Sam
and Belle cannot be presumed to have bargained away an opportunity. That is the nature of
their contracting with each other. If you assume particular parties like these apparent
rogues, you do not enforce their agreement. You enforce an idealized version: yours or the
law's.
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his consent theory is the substitution of the subjectivism of the
parties with the idealization of the legal regime. If one remembers
that consent theory rests on a justification concerning local knowledge having superiority over general or particular knowledge from
other sources, one may be confused when the issue becomes
whether people might bargain away or misunderstand their rights
to receive good faith performance.
Similarly, an old Florida case refused to enforce a conjuring
bontract.1 1 5 This case illustrates liberal traditional theory's failure
at its most critical juncture. The court refused to dignify such contractual intention. " 6 Whether extra-party considerations or a factual issue of actual assent led to the court's decision is not clear.
But to rule the contract invalid on party-bound considerations requires some reason and even some common sense. The judge would
not carry whatever liberalism he or the parties held so far as to
dignify their intentions. Similarly, the occasional modern breach of
contract case of "date-break" for failure to abide by a "social" obligation sometimes goes the same way. I too might think conjuring
contracts, date contracts, and the like odd in some sense, but I do
not think my opinion counts very much on what these parties may
have thought about the seriousness and dignity of their
arrangements.
The missing default rule for these cases, however, is intention
to be bound and this highly factual issue cannot be drowned in a
rule of law. Here, as everywhere, we must seek information about
the subjective agreement as to intention to be legally bound. Procedural legal rules remind us to ask but they cannot answer the
question. Nevertheless, we might enact immutable default rules for
these cases as with the duty of good faith performance. There is a
great temptation to do that because of the apparent certainty, efficiency, and stability that legal rules bring. The error this breeds is
the creation of conventionalist rules for cases that may be less
likely to happen than actually do. If the aim is to maximize congruence between legal results and the subjective agreements of
parties, then to assume these subjective agreements are more likely
than not a reflection of conventional rules may misconstrue parties
who fight over waivers of seemingly central legal rules like good
faith performance, conjuring contracts, or date-breaks. If these are
people more unconventional than most, it would seem that if any
default rules will capture their subjective agreement, which is the
115. Cooper v. Livingston, 19 Fla. 684 (1883).
116. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that conjuring was not a valid consideration
and that no one would voluntarily pay $250 for a conjurer.
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assumption in Barnett's claim and implicit in contract law, they
will be generally unconventional and locally conventional default
rules. This is why hierarchically imposed rules are less likely to
maximize finding the subjective agreement.
If consent theory leads to preferences over default rule-candidates, they are the wrong preferences. What matters is the parties'
mutual subjective agreement. Where no disagreement between the
parties exists, worrying about the applicable default rule is naive.
The parties do not need helpful presumptuousness. It is one matter that the parties agreed. The only legal issue presented is how
the legal system gathers the evidence. It is perfectly tolerable in an
imperfect world of knowledge that parties may choose to roll the
dice in front of a jury. Letting that happen accords best with the
contractual aim of effectuating the parties' intentions. If traditionalists like Barnett agree with this, they need to focus on the
proceduralism of contracts cases. My computer cannot operate
without a default rule because it has no mind of its own. Real people can and do. Discovering their consent if they had subjectively
agreed requires listening to their stories.
Furthermore, default rules may not be the best way to gather
the intentions of parties who actually subjectively agreed, unless
we assume that the parties entered an agreement that will never be
clear enough operationally. People so situated do not report, by
way of preface, being in subjective agreement, and the only issue is
whose view of our agreement is correct. Thus, if consent theory
favors a conventionalist rule of the particular community for such
cases, that same rule would apply as well in other cases in which
there had been subjective disagreement. Unless we knew how
many of each would arise, or more importantly how to identify
cases of subjective agreement from subjective disagreement, default rules cannot promise interpretation that corresponds to the
actual agreement of parties.
B.

Penalty Default Rules for Subjective Disagreements

The growing literature on contractual default rules even embraces the unconventional suggestion of penalty default rules.117
Penalty default rules serve as incentive for getting one party to a
contract to reveal a preference for a contract provision contrary to
the otherwise applicable default rule. Penalty default rules have
also been said to have value in inducing one party to share impor117. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13. Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
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tant information with another.' 18 Leading penalty default theorists
have made it plain that penalty default rules are purposely set
counter-intuitively just so they may have the sought-after effect on
party-behavior: the parties must express their own preferred contract term."1 9 Nevertheless, Barnett claims that his consent theory
offers a "justification for using conventionalist default rules as penalty defaults."' 120 The idea of a conventionalist yet penalty default
rule seems oxymoronic because a definition of a penalty rule is one
that "the parties would not want."1 2 '
Not only must the liberal principles that ground the consent
theory not be indifferent to the choice of default rules for any parties or indulge the gamesmanship of penalty defaults, they also
must not risk the precious price knowledge by centrally planning
contract terms. Barnett cannot give up the core of will theory, sub118. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91.
119. Id.
120. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 887.
121. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91. Evidently, these writers mean this
stronger sense of a penalty rule, a symmetrical penalty, as in their question-begging example
of the U.C.C. rule that a failure to agree upon a quantity of goods invalidates an agreement
for the sale of goods. Ayres and Gertner suggest that this penalty default cannot be explained by what the parties would have wanted: "Obviously, the parties would not have
gone to the expense of contracting with the intention that nothing be exchanged." Id. at 96.
But many of us go to the expense of bargaining without reaching what we expect to be a
binding agreement. In such cases we do not regard not being bound to our agreement because we cannot or have yet to agree on the quantity as any penalty at all. Likewise, as
Ayres and Gertner seemingly believe, the U.C.C. is not inconsistent as between open price
and open quantity terms because the Code requires an intent to contract where the price
term is left open. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1990). What they might mean is that the Code could
have provided the same test for open quantity cases. Ayres and Gertner explain the Code's
refraining from setting the quantity as a "reasonable" quantity by the claim that it is systematically harder for the courts to figure out quantity than price. Thus, price can be determined from market information. "But to estimate a reasonable quantity, courts would need
to undertake a more costly analysis of the individual litigants of the type 'How much did
the buyer and seller value the marginal rutabagas?'" Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 96.
This assumes that for a price term market, and not individualized, valuation is accepted,
but the contrary for quantity.
Aside from the latter discussion, Ayres and Gertner use a weaker form of penalty default to mean a rule that one party would not want, an asymmetrical penalty. That is Barnett's use as well. Thus, a default rule may be conventionalist in Barnett's sense because it
reflects the ordinary expectations of parties to such contracts, but at the same time the rule
may be a penalty from the point of view of the other party to the contract who does not
expect such a default rule. Rationally informed parties are the object of the penalty rule.
Their superior knowledge or reason to know makes them the party to be penalized by a
penalty rule that creates an incentive t6 agree otherwise. Unless parties do agree to another
rule, the penalty rule applies. This is defensible from the point of view of consent because of
the conventional nature of the penalty rule, which accords with the common sense expectation of the party to the contract who was not rationally informed about the applicable rule.
Perhaps there are conventional but penalty rules of this sort, but Barnett's use of the damages rule of Hadley v. Baxendale does not advance his claim for conventional penalty rules.
See infra text accompanying note 123.
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jective assent, because to do so risks an objectification of contract
that would eventually fictionalize personal or local- knowledge.
Thus,
[w]hen one party is rationally ignorant of the background rules of
contract and the other party is not-that is, the other party is
either knowledgeable or irrationally ignorant-default rules can
reduce the instances of subjective disagreements arising between
parties who otherwise are manifesting mutual consent.12
Barnett illustrates the idea that default rules can reduce actual disagreement by a rule he calls conventional, which is familiar
to all lawyers, the rule of damages for consequential loss spawned
by Hadley v. Baxendale.1 3 Carriers are repeat players in the delivery game for whom knowing the law of damages for their misperformances is rational."' Those who use these services might do
so only occasionally and are unlikely to need or be expected to
know the current versions of that great case. Therefore, this is a
good example in which default rules may do their job of reducing
parties' disagreements as to the extent of damages for a carrier's
breach.
The default rule should reflect everyday common sense in instances as this so that the onus is placed on the repeat player, the
rationally informed party, to express a preference for a damages
term that deviates from common sense. But what constitutes everyday common sense of people who use carriers on the issue of appropriate damages is doubtfully a matter of common knowledge. I
suspect that most people would say, "all of the above," given a list
of four "losses," even if only two of the four were reasonably foreseeable. Even so, these consumers may well be rationally uninformed people and so not expected to know the rule. Yet I wonder
whether the test of reasonably foreseeable losses can be considered
a part of anyone's common knowledge. Lawyers, too, will disagree
about what is or is not a foreseeable loss under Hadley. Similarly,
commentators have noted that Hadley might well be viewed as
protectionist.' 5 Calling Hadley a conventional rule within every122. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 887.
123. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Indeed, it seems to be something of a rule
lately that anyone who writes about contract rules cannot omit Hadley. See, e.g., Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 13, at 101-04.
124. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 887-90.
125. On one hand, it has been suggested that this narrow liability for consequential
damages protected particular groups. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 188 (1977). Another commentator suggested how the rule benefited the judges who invented it. See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the
Industrialization of the Law, 4 J"LEGAL STUD. 249, 267-74 (1975).
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day common sense may rank with Holmes' objectification of
Raffles.1 2
Substantive default rules may derive from consent theory by a
preference for penalty default rules whenever one of the parties is
rationally informed 12 7 about the default rule while the other party
is not. When only one party knows the rule, consent theory favors
adopting a default rule penalizing the rationally informed party.
By such a penalty the law would encourage the rationally interested party to discover the rule and educate the other (rationally
uninterested party) 128 about the rule in the course of bargaining a
different rule. The result of this legally encouraged behavior will
likely reduce subjective disagreements on the matter covered by
129
the default rule.
A penalty default rule encourages one party to inform the
other party of the law. 130 For example, the Federal Express disclaimer of liability conspicuously attached to the package lets the
customers, who are unlikely to spend money learning their legal
rights, learn these rights by the expenditure of money by Federal
Express, the party best situated to learn and share these rights.
This, it is said, exemplifies a penalty default rule that by being
penal encourages the penalized party to obtain agreement other
than what the law provides. I do not know why anyone should
think that the very narrow contract law rule as to consequential
damages should be thought so penal as to encourage Federal Express to act as they do. The rule is that unless a carrier such as
Federal Express knows or has reason to know of an unusual loss its
customer will suffer, it has no liability for any loss beyond the typically minor loss of use that ordinarily follows from late delivery.
To view this rule, which may well destroy the expectations of the
126.

See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 41-42 (1974).

127. This means their willingness to learn the default rule arisbs from the benefit received exceeding the costs of learning the rule. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at
866. With the exception of Coleman, recent default rule commentary seems to ignore the
several assumptions this makes about people-what I briefly described as the problem of
ignorance. See supra part III.B.1.
128. The rationally uninterested party does not appreciate the immediate risk of ignorance and lacks motivation for self-education.
129. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 889.
130. I think the point, if practical, encourages one party to obtain the other's consent
to a different rule. There is some difference between that, and providing by a legal rule a
duty to inform. At least the latter fairly enables the rationally uninformed party to know of
the stakes a contractual variation adduces. Merely encouraging agreement around the rule is
likely to see many ignorant consents to the variation. A more consensual-forcing device
might attempt to impose on the rationally informed party to dicker expressly for the variable rule or directly provide the relevant information. Yet, this is all too likely to dissipate
into formularism.
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relatively and understandably weaker party to such a transaction,
as penalizing a carrier is peculiar. We may pierce the gloom by
substituting the more familiar expressions "stronger" and
"weaker" parties to the transaction for the elusive expressions "rationally informed" and "rationally uninformed."
First, this does not at all follow from the liberal philosophy
behind the consent theory. Only the parties themselves, under the
principle of personal knowledge, know best.'8 1 To tinker with their
knowledge as would a default theorist cannot be supported unless
there is a well-defined "tinkering" line. A nonpenal default rule
might be known by either a rationally interested, disinterested, or
uninterested party;' 32 and any of these parties might at reasonable
cost change the rule. Though it may be true that rationally interested parties may more likely learn and bargain for a change in
any rule that disfavors them 3 3 than the others, it does not clearly
131. It is noteworthy here to recall how even a will theorist such as FRIED, supra note
12, avoids the inconsistencies of a more explicit (or candid) philosopher like Barnett by
refraining from plumbing the depths of his autonomy principle. By doing so, Fried manages
to allow for any sort of theory to justify gap-filling. But in itself, that appears to be an
inconsistency or incompleteness that weakens his will theory which believes in gaps. Reconceived under the refined will theory, the rhetoric of gaps and incompleteness turn out to
have been a feature of an objective theory produced by conceptualizing manifestations of
intention as material only when expressed by particular modes: in documents or by particular speech or conduct. By conceptually widening the lens of legal materiality, will theory
converts a problem of contract theory into a problem unique to a particular theory, the
objective theory of contracts. That is the general point of a different theory: to provide
another way of analyzing a problem.
132. Some people who make contracts may generally appreciate damages for breach.
The general categories of expectation, reliance, and restitution may even be intuitively understood by those who, for the most part, work out their differences. Any contract theory
should strive to match whatever these intuitions are. Proposals to produce consent on the
basis of non-intuitive or counter-intuitive damages rules such as penal rules risk confounding understanding and producing artificial legal incentives.
133. I am not convinced that this is as likely as would appear from its frequent recitation in the default rule literature. The repeat maker of a certain kind of contract, such as
Federal Express, can try to spread the cost of learning and bargaining around a legal rule;
an occasional or one-time maker of the same contract cannot spread the cost. Thus, those
who can spread costs may be able to bear these costs. But for the firm to spread costs
assumes that the firm can afford to spread these costs, which implies either substantial control over prices or that the competition will do the same. A firm that has price control lacks
incentive to spread costs or is indifferent about the substance of the legal default rules. A
firm so positioned may be able to recover losses post hoc and may lack the incentive supposed. A competitive market firm may no more have the ability or incentive to learn and
educate people about substantive default rules unless to do so does not impair its competitive position, as where every similarly situated firm is doing so. But this begins to build
assumptions about behavior that need not be correct. If the assumptions do not hold in
particular markets this would result in penalty default rules becoming unjustifiable not only
on the moral ground of their involuntariness, but also on the ground that they do not serve
the informational role Barnett and others seek. Penalty defaults are supposed to cure irrationality by this informational function. To presume they will is dangerous unless we are
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follow that the cost of learning the rule is unreasonable to others,
unless Barnett meant by reasonable cost the cost a reasonably interested party would originally pay. If that is true, however, more
problems for consent theory may emerge than it helps resolve. 13 '
Barnett's argument from the differently situated parties seeks
to show that the penalty default rulesl"s are more likely to reduce
subjective disagreements between the parties. But the result of
penalty default rules in these cases may merely be binding the rationally uninformed party on the risk-assumption principle. The
product of encouraging the informed party to educate the uninformed party may be an agreement objectively manifested by the
parties. Even if the latter is true, as in Barnett's example of the
Federal Express packaging conspicuously disclaiming liability beyond what it states, this provides incomplete evidence that the
parties had subjectively agreed to the disclaimer. The argument
begs the question, whi ch is whether the parties had subjectively
agreed. Unless we know they had agreed and that the disclaimer
reflected that agreement, we cannot know that the penalty default
rule produced the happy result imagined.
A penalty default rule might incite the party penalized to
make an agreement otherwise if he could. Whether this would affect the real world at all is not clear. If it would not, then a penalty
default rule's justification as an incentive fails. What Barnett expects from a penalty default rule need not follow from knowledge
of that rule. All promisors have a very good reason to seek the consent of their promisees to limit liability. Like others, Federal Express has a motive to include its disclaimer prominently in the bargain whether or not the default rule harmed or favored them. This
boiler plate may have an in terrorem effect against making claims.
Moreover, consent theory has nothing whatever to do with ensure that the penalty default will work or that the penalty rule well serves the expectations
of the weaker party who now, as under Hadley, must live with it without having had the
opportunity to know she should have taken other precautions. Ayres and Gertner write as
though the lawmakers should be ready to enact their penalty defaults, yet their article
seems to suggest some data might first be collected. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at
92-93, 107.
134. Consent theory would seem to create a proliferation of default rules by requiring
that stronger parties always bear the risk of penalty default terms. Since we may never
know in advance which party is the rationally informed party, we seem to need multiple and
different default rules for every problem we might foresee.
135. The Hadley rule is, of course, penal to the customer and not the carrier as I
previously suggested and is not conventional to the customer though it may appear so to the
carrier. That is precisely why the rhetoric of commonsense and conventionalist rules in
Sound of Silence is bewildering. If conventionalism and common sense may be so trusted,
why central planning cannot be entrusted to discover the same, the problem of personal or
local knowledge, is mysterious. This theme haunts the objective consent theory of contract.
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couraging parties with good reasons to overthrow default rules.
These parties are those who would come out poorly under a default
rule. The disfavored party should serve her own interest by gaining
agreement on another rule. This is a beneficial effect of the theory
of promulgation, which informs the choice of a penalty default rule
so that parties may learn of their rights under the default rule and
then may choose their own contract rules. Working perfectly, this
would seem to lead to the blessings of consent and bargain theory
under which in exchange for my surrendering my right to the default rule, my promisor gives up something in exchange. Barnett
makes no such claim but implies that a properly drawn penalty
default rule can encourage such beneficial behavior.13 6 At the least
a penalty default rule encourages making the private contrary contract rule express in the bargain. Although this makes it legally
easier, on the objective theory, to deny the disfavored party's claim
not to have consented to such a private rule, I do not know what it
means if the "duty to read" is inapplicable. And this takes us back
to the supposition that central planning, here the legal community,
should control the issue of consent-that the law should dictate a
"duty to read" or any other immutable rule of consent.
C. The U.C.C. Default Rules and ContractualIntent
Two accounts may be given for the concept of the U.C.C. default rules. First, the Code drafters thought that they knew the
substantive default rules intended by parties. Second, gap-fillers
permitted a freer presumption of validity to goods contracts. The
realists who prepared the Code held no brief for the classical contract law notion of indefiniteness under which a court might invalidate a contract if the parties left too much unexpressed in their
agreement. The gap-fillers wrote indefiniteness out of the U.C.C.
sales article. Thus, parties who intended to contract might have
enforcement of their contract if there would be any way to do So.137
The drafters' assumption was that commercial goods transactions should enjoy a presumption of validity, and the cryptic rule
of section 2-204(3) accomplished that. In order to believe in the
presumption of validity, one must also believe that open terms (as
opposed to indefinite terms) do not presumptively bespeak a lack
of contractual intention. Open terms signify an incomplete contract, so to speak, and not the absence of a contract. The issue
then becomes how the drafters know this. Barnett's answer seems
136.
137.

See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 889.
This free paraphrase is from U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1990).
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to be that parties consent to default terms. However, neither Barnett nor the Code knows this to be true of all parties or of most
parties. For example, real estate lease renewal contracts have been
problematic because we do not know whether the parties have signaled the courts to find a reasonable price or not. 138 Whether real
estate lease renewal contracts should share a presumption of validity remains controversial.
The Code drafters thought they knew merchants well enough
to presume validity." 9 But even the Code drafters provided the
vague traditional test of intent to contract as a way out of open
term cases in which parties were shown not to share a zest for validity. 140 The U.C.C. gap-filling premise assumes that the parties
would prefer resolution of the case to the invalidation of the agreement, even if in advance neither would have chosen the particular
default rule. This is not the same as consent theory's premise:
agreements entail some genuine consent to a gap-filler. Consent to
gap-filling exists but only if there is an intent to contract. This
gap-filling is as comfortably fit within will theory as within consent
theory. Thus, the classical indefiniteness notion could betray as
much in will theory as it found support in will theory. Intention to
be bound might be present, but indefiniteness might yet prove
fatal.
The modernist program exemplified by the U.C.C. gap-fillers
thus reversed classical theory and created a presumption of validity to incomplete agreements by preparing default rules to fill the
gaps. Classicists would have left the parties to the legal underground of invalidity. A leading indefiniteness case, Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp.,"' illustrates the different approaches. The Florida Supreme Court reversed a lower court's ruling that an expression in an agreement
was too indefinite and the agreement therefore lacked the definiteness necessary for legal obligation." 2 The high court ordered the
trial court to determine what the parties meant by the term."43 If
one assumes that the parties themselves had left the term vague so
138. Compare Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541
(N.Y. 1981) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 33-34 (1979).
139. MURPHY & SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW '433 (4th ed. 1991); Carolyn M.
Edwards, Contract Formulation Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 61
MARQ. L. REV. 215, 219 (1977).
140. "[A] contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended
to make a contract ...." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1990).
141. 302 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1974).
142. The inartful phrase was "any cash flow benefit." Id. at 406.
143. Id. at 410.
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that each could assent to the bargain without committing to the
meaning of the term, modernists and classicists may fairly disagree
about whether the court correctly resolved the dispute. Modernists
believe it is morally fair to impose legal obligation in that case because the parties assumed that risk. Classicists believe it is unfair
to impose obligation there because no such risk was assumed. If we
further assume that the Blackhawk contract was entirely executory
when brought to court, the classicist may have the better position
while the modernist enjoys the advantage once either party puts
expenditures at risk in the performance of the bargain." Neither
position is particularly attractive since passing up other pre-agreement opportunities may be as probative of true intent to be bound
as is post-agreement reliance. The cardinal feature of these discussions is whether the parties intended to be bound and accepted the
risk of judicial completion of their incomplete agreement. Both will
theory and Barnett's consent theory brings one to this central issue. Consent theory may too quickly glide through that issue, however, if one is accustomed to presume consent to the default rules,
for then the significance of gaps in the agreement may be missed.
Gaps may appear either because parties are willing to be bound
even if the agreement is not yet incomplete or because parties feel
they are not ready to be bound.
The Code gap-fillers rest on a fundamental belief that incompleteness in contracts should not be fatal if the parties intended a
144. A reliance or unjust enrichment theory might permit the classicist to insist that
even in the latter event the court might adjust the parties post-agreement situation and
preclude losses in reliance on the party's mistaken assumption of the agreement's validity.
But that is merely another way in which one recognizes the unfairness of the post-hoc status
quo and surrenders to the modernist. Unjust enrichment rules provide default rules for the
post-executory invalid agreement. The significant difference between contract and unjust
enrichment rules lies in the variability permitted by contract but not by these other areas.
Depending on the variability permitted, on a continuum of slight to substantial, the differences between these forms of legal obligation will be slight or substantial. Contract may
permit clearer expression of the rules of obligation, ironically, by complete substantive silence. Eschewing default rules of any substance could force parties to clearer expression of
their contractual obligations.
Based on another criterion, some may see will theory as the worst of all contract worlds.
Default rules of substance, such as U.C.C. gap-fillers and perhaps restitution, they might
say, permit the cost-savings clearer written expressions require. Thus, forms are preferred to
specially drafted documents; elliptic expressions are preferred full expressions. Nonsubstantive default rules would thus seem to impose more on parties than sensible substantive
rules. That is the conventional supposition. But believing that is merely a consequence of
conceptualizing the "facts" of gaps. Proving that off-the-rack rules will save costs presumes
that substantive rules may be found that courts or parties themselves will view as quickly
dispositive. The most frequently discussed default rules, however, such as Hadley's broad
foreseeability principle of liability for consequential damage, permits any party willing to
suffer protracted litigation to do so.
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contract and if looseness in their expression or agreement might be
overcome. One strategy for overcoming the problem was enacting
rules in the Code to fill the gaps. A second strategy was expanding
evidence
the idea of contract and broadening the scope of material
14 5
to permit the parties to fill the gaps themselves.
Even the rules the Code adopts to fill gaps typically leave the
parties free to present evidence as to what they meant. The Code
section that may fill the important gap of a price term exemplifies
the Code's sound resistance to imposing on parties. One may find
differing views as to the conventionality of the rule regarding missing price terms and whether agreements lacking price should ever
be enforced.1 46 To regard the U.C.C. missing price term section as
a substantive rule misses its point. First, the section only applies
on satisfaction of the critical test of whether the parties intended a
contract without an agreement as to price. Second, the section does
not impose any particular price but calls for a "reasonable price,"
which leaves parties free to present evidence as to what they
thought was a reasonable price.
Even where the Code goes perhaps too far and specifies substance, its broad idea of agreement", 7 and its variability by agreement' 4 8 limit the effect of substantive rules. For example, the mercantile exclusion of warranties by the expression, "as is," could
mean something else to two consumers trading a toaster over the
backyard fence. They might suppose this means that the seller is
not promising to repair any obvious defects, such as stains on the
finish of the toaster. Yet, that could still be consistent with a
seller's warranty that the toaster would do everything the buyer
said she wanted.
The zest for objectification to manage the communication
problem, what Barnett labels the second-order problem of knowledge, creates tension in the solution to the first-order problem,
leaving the appropriate decision-making power to those best situated. Perhaps substantive default rules molded on conventionalism
cannot do a better job than nonsubstantive default rules, open-ended and neutral rules. Contract's choice of the result most likely
intended by parties as they were situated when they agreed is a
different choice than a substantive default rule. For the better
part, the Code cultivated the former.
145. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (1990).
146. The lease renewal cases represent one strained arena. See supra note 138 and
accompanying text.
147. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990).
148. Id. § 1-102(3).
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The U.C.C. gap-filling rules may be thought to be just the sort
of conventional substantive rules that the theory of consent would
breed, examples of consent theory in operation in the current legal
system. One who belongs to the dominant community will see her
view stated in the law. From this it becomes more likely than not
that the gap-fillers accord with the true subjective intents of the
parties because there are more dominant. Thus, choosing conventional substantive gap-fillers is proper when judged by the criterion of reducing instances of disagreement between judicial outcomes and parties' subjective intentions.
Choosing conventional gap-fillers is quite controversial because it presumes precisely what a consent theory ought to deny:
that disputes occur as often between parties of the same community of conventions as between parties of different communities.
All else being equal, one might suppose otherwise and build default rules accordingly. Indeed, the U.C.C. does quite a bit of that
and provides, for the greater part at least, non-substantive default
rules favoring no community, as in the party-centered emptiness of
reasonable price.
For example, the U.C.C. missing price term provision does not
adopt either a merchant's or a consumer's standard. 149 A
merchant's standard could be that price on average of such goods
in the applicable market. A consumer's standard could be the price
that would induce a reasonable consumer to contract.1 50 The
U.C.C. provision neutrally observes only that the court shall impose a reasonable price that leaves open either test or any other
uniquely suited test to provide the most likely congruence between
intent and result. Assuming a dispute between a merchant and a
consumer, no test can promise to reduce the discrepancy between
the actual disagreement of the parties. Barnett's theory only
promises to reduce the discrepancy between silence, a gap, and actual subjective agreement. If the two parties actually agreed, the
test most likely to reflect that agreement depends on whether
these parties belong to the same or different communities. If the
same, then use the conventional test of that community. If different, then neither community's test can be more accurate.
Default rule theory cannot establish that any substantive de149. Id. § 2-305.
150. Someone might object that no difference exists between the relevant market price
and the price that would induce the purchase by a reasonable buyer. Nevertheless, buyers
who have regularly bought at below-market values from sellers have a prima facie claim that
sellers in a particular open-ended transaction consented to a below-market price. To believe
otherwise requires either better evidence of the intentions of the parties or rejection of the
moral basis of contract as actual intention.
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fault rules correspond to the actual intentions of the parties. 15
Any substantive default rule measures up to traditional objective
theory for rationally informed parties because consent is there imputed on the basis of knowledge or notice and follows the general
idea of risk-assumption. Any conventional, commonsensical default
rule measures up to consent theory. Nevertheless, to suppose there
are conventional, commonsensical rules shared by the entire community of parties who are not rationally informed, those without
legal sophistication, would be unjustified. 52 Whether smaller
groups might benefit from substantive default rules, conventional
or penalty, may be exemplified by the U.C.C. which, in its various
provisions, speaks to specific groups or classes of contracting
parties.
For example, a seller of goods who is a "merchant with respect
to goods of that kind" warrants that the goods sold shall be merchantable. 53 This is a default rule within recent discussions because the merchant seller makes this warranty to buyers even
though the express agreement of sale says nothing specific about
warranties. Thus, this appears to conform to Barnett's and others'
idea of a substantive, off-the-rack default rule. But it is very narrow if importantly substantive. The open question for this warranty is what obligation it imposes. That obligation is no more
than that the goods conform to the trade practice."' For example,
a sale of "second-hand goods ... involves only such obligation as is
appropriate to such goods."' 5 5 Even though a seller must take action to negate a warranty of merchantability, the warranty itself is
tailored to the individual case by drawing in trade standards rather
than promulgating the substance of those standards. Under the
merchantability warranty, as with the other warranties in sales of
goods, even this specialized body of contract law refrains from imposing on parties what the law thinks they mean and leaves them
to show what they meant. Nor are the parties confined in that
151. Coleman et al., supra note 13, at 648. Substantive default rules are anathema to a
will theory. Although a will theory supports the motive to craft default rules producing convergence of rule and party intent, it will do so only when reliable evidence shows that the
parties affected do appreciate a particular rule. But then the rule is for those parties.
152. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 888 (Rational ignorance of the
default rule may be an excuse.). Query "may?" But this is not a problem Barnett creates.
The traditional view must talk in this way every time its substantive default rules are unfair
to a party, and the traditional view then leaps from validating party autonomy to policing
autonomy without noticing that its rules created the problem that hardly exists under another conception, will theory.
153. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1990).
154. Id. § 2-314(2)(a).
155. Id. § 2-314 cmt. 3.
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showing by their express agreements.
Merchant sellers, as well, are free by appropriate express
agreement or by the circumstances to show that the parties agreed
to no warranties at all. The disclaimer right given by the Code'"
might be viewed as an informational or educational duty imposed
on the more sophisticated contract party for the enlightenment of
the other party to the transaction. Yet the merchantability warranty that disclaimers typically eliminated are by no means any
sort of penalty default rule for the merchant who deals in trades in
which quality assurance is the norm.
Disclaimers mean, however, that a seller undertakes no quality
obligation and a particular disclaimer may surprise a buyer. Suppose a disclaimer is buried in the fine print on page nineteen of a
contract. Barnett suggests that such a clause may not be binding
for lack of manifested consent 5" if it deviates from commonsense
expectations, although some additional formality or making it
prominent might validate it. In his view, without some additional
formality or prominence the drafting party has no reason to believe that the other party consented to this counter-commonsensical term. Here, the difficulty suggested earlier that would result
from trying to tie conventional, commonsensical default terms to
subjective agreement emerges. 5 ' People whose commonsense expectations are offended by a term in a contract will not always or
easily come around to a new convention or another legal formality.
They may be no more likely to appreciate the unexpected no matter how many legal formalities we might try to promulgate. If a
community is at odds in its conventions and common sense, conventions and common sense cannot assure what is appreciated by
signing here or listening there. We can only present the principles
and factors that bear on whether we can fairly ascribe responsibility and trust parties and the courts to listen to the stories of the
parties and evaluate those in light of all the factors. After all, what
156. Id. § 2-316.
157. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 2, at 889-90, 890 n.183.
158. Barnett takes the cohventional view and assumes that adding formalities beyond
those of present contract law, such as signing a contract, can help solve the problem of
"invisible terms." See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HArv. L. REV. 1174, 1251 (1983). This misconceives the problem: there is no more reason
to expect people to appreciate additional formalities than those that already exist. Nor will
people, who already do appreciate existing formalities and expect that their contractual
counterparts are bound by what they sign, have increased respect for one more formality.
The law could haul everyone into court and warn them of their "Miranda" contract rights,
but that will soon dissipate into costly incantations and nothing more. For example, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 originally provided hearings for all debt reaffirmations, but
soon cut section 524 back. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1986).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/1

54

Kalevitch: Gaps in Contracts

CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY

1993]

223

is "reasonable" is a nice question, just as it is also when we ask if
the buyer actually assented to any particular express term.
What was said about the lack of substance in the U.C.C.'s examples of default rules may also be said about the various other
supplementary Code provisions. Even the delivery terms, F.O.B.
and the like, begin with the caveat "unless otherwise agreed," and
so do not mean to do more than provide a definition of what the
parties' actual agreement, F.O.B., means for cases in which the
parties cannot show another meaning. Even then, however the parties are free to show by appropriate evidence a different
understanding.
In sum, the U.C.C. eschews the imposition of substantive default rules and instead welcomes the implications of will theory by
freely inviting parties to show what their actual agreement was. In
this realm, there is neither sense nor need for significantly substantive or penalty defaults to induce parties to come to an actual and
clearly expressed verbal agreement. Parties make their agreements
in accordance with either conventional or personal standards. General contract law and sales law gain their moral force by expecting
the conventional and being prepared for the unconventional
agreements.
VI.

CONCLUSION: NONSUBSTANTIVE DEFAULT RULES

The traditional view of contract law is essentially inconsistent
in supposing that default rules and background rules of substance
may be imposed on contracting parties and at the same time supposing that contract obligation rests on the morality of party
choice. If contract law could know a priori what parties would have
chosen, then it might proceed in that fashion. To suppose choice
requires that parties, not law, choose. More modern contract law in
the form of the U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) wisely refrain
from imposing that choice on contracting parties. Professor Randy
Barnett's consent theory cannot stem the tide returning to will
theory. He thinks that central planning lacks the personal and local knowledge necessary to best organize resources. No one need
disagree with that premise to reject his theory. Central planning in
the form of the legislator or judge on Barnett's premises cannot
predetermine penalty rules from undeserved rewards. What Barnett has said as to the conventional default rules flowing from consent theory may make the same error or it is harmlessly tautological: conventionalist default or background rules are more likely to
mirror the expectations of parties who hold conventionalist suppositions. Conventional people have conventional expectations.
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Barnett offers no reason beyond tautology why we should not
respect experience rather than tautology on the possibilities of
conventionalism for a pluralistic society. A pronounced tendency
to presume certain present rules to be conventionalist and facilely
applicable to the unconventionalist or the rationally ignorant person should concern anyone with a decent regard for a morally
plausible law of contracts.
Nevertheless, Barnett's theory does the best that can be done
under the traditional view of contract law. The best theory of contract law, however, has no substantive rules. The courts should not
propound fictitious consent so that there may be a law of contracts. Contracts can flourish without courts' propounding the hypotheses of the elite or the oppressed. Parties who want contract
enforcement may well find, as have so many, other tribunals that
are willing to proceed on fact. Contract disputes do not need the
kind of law propounded by objective theories. Contract does not
need law;1 59 the law needs contract.

159. But some contracting parties might feel such a need. These will be those whom
Barnett indulges with the soubriquet, "rationally informed people," and whom others call
"stronger parties." They will come to law with an ample supply of rules from their boilerplates. Every contract theory, including consent theory, provides incentives for stronger parties to bring their own rules. When they do, consent may, just may, morally justify contract
enforcement. If those stronger parties draft overreaching boilerplate, they become suspect in
their claim that their promisor consented by signing the form, whether the promisor signed
once or in thirty places. Central planning will respond with new spurious formalities and
objective tests. The process of paradoxical consent may only be stopped by a better, more
morally plausible account of consent as autonomy. No philosophical surrogates will do what
will theory can.
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